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iPREFACE
People have always suffered from disease. It is, however,
as much a social as a biological construct: What defines the state
of being ill, and what is considered an appropriate response to it,
differ both cross culturally and over time. As Charles Rosenberg
says, perceptions of disease are both "context-specific" and
81context-determining.nl To the social historian, investigating
the expressions and effects of disease can be a fruitful way to
study the contexts in which they occur -- social institutions,
gender roles, religious beliefs, power relationships, political
forces, class and racial divisions.
If the study of illness can be a boon to the historian,
however, it can also be a bane. Some responses are highly visible
(hospitals, nurse and physician roles, health insurance) and not
too difficult to interpret. Others, however, are emotionally
charged, not visible at all and present serious research problems.
Did a diarist not mention the illness from which a loved one died
because it was unknown, or because it was too painful (or shameful)
to think about? How can we know the lVcodes*l by which socially
unacceptable diseases were discussed, or recover the knowing look
or lifted eyebrow by which people conveyed information about them?
How can we tease out prescriptive behaviors for patients, families,
'Charles E. Rosenberg, "Introduction," in Framina  Disease:
Studies in Cultural History, eds. Rosenberg and Janet Golden (New
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992),  p. xx.
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care-givers when they were often deeply embedded in the cultures
in which they occurred? How can we convince guardians of medical
records that historical research is a respectable undertaking in
which it is possible to honor tenets of medical confidentiality?
For the social historian of the early twentieth century,
studying tuberculosis offers all the rewards -and frustrations
alluded to above. It was in some ways a new disease because its
communicability was demonstrated only in 1882, but it was also an
old disease, and people knew its symptoms and how it progressed.
Accessible as much information is, it is almost impossible now to
recover what the experience of being sick and dying of tuberculosis
was like. There is an amazing paucity of representation of the
disease in any artistic medium; materials in letters, diaries,
memoirs and autobiographies is scant in the extreme. The silence
surrounding the disease suggests that people were both ashamed and
terrified. Such feelings persist still. On a visit to a town in
upstate New York near both Trudeau's famous sanatorium and a state
tuberculosis facility, both closed for nearly forty years, I asked
at'the  local historical society if any section of the town still
contained a concentration of houses with sleeping porches (an
indication that they had housed tuberculosis patients or ex-
patients). The sixty-something lady at the desk informed me in
outraged tones "people like that It had NEVER lived in HER town.
Rosenberg's comment that perceptions of disease are context-
shaping was in my mind constantly as I wrote this paper. It has
become apparent in the last five years that people with AIDS have
iii
developed antibiotic-resistant strains of tuberculosis. If
antibiotic therapy has indeed lost much of its efficacy, tuberculo-
sis today could be as communicable and dangerous as it was one
hundred years ago.* Like many consumptives at the turn of the
century, today's tuberculosis patients are defined by,middle  class
society as toother.*' In 1900 they were often the immigrant poor;
today they are the HIV-positive. If we are to make thoughtful
decisions about how to ensure that these new consumptives obtain
effective, humane treatment, we should be informed about the
results of reactions of physicians, policy makers and citizens at
the turn of the century.
A project such as this inevitably owes much to many. My
interest in Hartford and appreciation for what a fascinating city
it is was first stimulated by Susan Pennybacker; she and the
members of the Hartford Studies Group have been continuing sources
of encouragement. Barbara Sicherman's  contribution antedates her
helpful comments as reader; my research on tuberculosis began as
an independent study paper I did for her which appears here in
altered form as Chapter I. Her knowledge of related work in the
social history of medicine and public health is truly encyclopedic
and made identifying secondary sources much more complete than it
would have been without her. Eugene Leach was a most tolerant
*The recent periodical literature covering this development is
extensive. The best summary of the social and medical ramifica-
tions of the re-emergence of TB appeared in a series of articles by
reporters Michael Specter, Elisabeth Rosenthal and Lawrence Altman
in The New York Times (October 11 - 15, 1992). See also Ken
Chowder, "How TB Survived Its Own Death to Confront Us Again,"
Smithsonian 23 (November 1992): 180 - 194.
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thesis advisor, since I had no idea when I began where the research
would lead. The final product has benefitted greatly from his
careful, thoughtful reading, comments and questions. Finally, the
research would not have been possible at all without the assistance
of Steve Lytle, archivist at Hartford Hospital. I was fortunate
that the principal sources of information I would need were in a
repository so well organized and so efficiently run. Steve also
answered questions, located photographs, and even managed to listen
patiently and with every appearance of interest when I insisted
upon telling him about new bits of information I discovered in the
old board minutes he found for me. To all these people, as well
as to friends and members of my family who now know more about
tuberculosis than they ever wanted to, I am grateful. Responsibil-
ity for facts and interpretations offered here, of course, is mine
alone.
1INTRODUCTION
One of the cliches of historical discourse is that Progressive
Era reform in the United States brought with it bureaucratic
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structures through which professional elites sought to contain and
control burgeoning, often unruly, urban populations. As this study
will show, however, concepts as abstract as "social control" are
not adequate to explain real events. An investigation of forces
.I
,/.
which shaped the institutional treatment of the tubercular poor in
Hartford,,Connecticut  in the first decade of the twentieth century "
must illuminate why, after promoting and funding a voluntary hos-
pital's  small sanatorium, city authorities, physicians and a
representative of working class interests shifted their support to
a state operated network of sanatoria for tubercular patients.
Although fear of the consumptive poor and hence a need to control
them was one of the impulses which made the American medical
community support sanatoria, such concerns were only background to
what happened in Hartford. At least in that city, the economics
and politics of both the city and its medical resources were
important determinants of policy, and ideas about appropriate
solutions to the tuberculosis problem changed quite  rapidly. The
11socialcontro181  rubric, helpful as it is in describing the effects
of progressive reform, must be evoked within the context of locally
specific circumstances.
2BACKGROUND: SANATORIA AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
Thomas Mann's The Masic Mountain, set in the years just before
World War I, is the story of a young man's seven year stay in a
tuberculosis1  sanatorium2  in Germany. The novel remains the
classic description of those hotel/hospitals in which patients
spent hours lying in the open air, ate large meals, and waited for
their disease to cure itself. When we think of sanatoria today,
we imagine them as Mann's plush European institution, a separate
world in which privileged people 'spent years of romantic soul-
searching while healing.
The reality, at least for working class and poor consumptives
in the United States, was rather different. For those without
means, the burden of tending a consumptive relative was often
insupportable, and such patients ended up in almshouses, city
hospitals or public sanatoria. Such patients usually delayed
seeking help and so were admitted late in the course of their
disease, often unwillingly; their stay was usually measured in
lnTuberculosisVV as used in this paper should be understood as
"pulmonary tuberculosis" unless otherwise noted. The disease most
often attacked lungs; though manifestations in other body systems
were possible, the pulmonary form of the disease was the most
infectious and hence the one physicians and public health officials
focused upon. "Consumption" and V1 hthisis"P were other terms
synonymous with pulmonary tuberculosis.
2rSanatorium' is the spelling used by all primary sources
reviewed for this paper. Adolphus  Knopf, a prominent New York
physician and educator active in the prevention of tuberculosis
movement, explained: **It is called sanatorium from the Latin word
sanare, to heal, and is a healing institution. It is not a
sanitarium which, derived from the word sanitas, health, rather
means a health resort....11  S. Adolphus  Knopf, "The Ideal Sanatori-
um, The Ideal Physician, The Ideal Nurse, and The Ideal Patient,V1
New York Medical Journal 10 (October 11, 1919): 641.
3weeks to months rather than in years, and they were seldom cured.
It is they with which this paper is concerned.
The American sanatorium movement began in 1885, when Edward
Trudeau, a consumptive physician who had cured himself by living
a simple outdoor life New York's Adirondack mountains, opened his
Adirondack Cottage Sanatorium in Saranac Lake, New York. It became
the most famous American institution of its kind and retained its
cachet as well as its generous funding by private donors until it
closed in 1954.3 Trudeau's sanatorium opened three years after
Koch presented his discovery of the tuberculosis bacillus to the
scientific community. These two events, Trudeau's successful
sanatorium treatment and the identification of tuberculosis as a
communicable disease, initiated more than fifty years of efforts
to cure people with contagious tuberculosis while isolating them
in sanatoria. The mainstays of treatment were rest, food and fresh
air. Although the 1930s saw the advent of surgical procedures to
arrest the disease by collapsing the diseased lung, real cure was
not achieved until the antibiotics developed during World War II
3Robert Taylor, Saranac: America's Maaic  Mountain (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1986),  p. 74. Although Trudeau seems not to
have based his institution upon any specific models, he must have
known about sanatoria in Europe, which had evolved from *'spas"  and
llbathsll and served an affluent clientele. Active since mid-
century, they remained important influences upon American medical
thought about tuberculosis treatment at least until World War I.
See F.B. Smith, The Retreat of Tuberculosis (London: Croom Helm,
1988),  pp. 97-100 for a discussion of Continental sanatoria and the
physicians who ran them.
..!
4became available.4 Beginning in the 195Os, sanatoria closed or
were converted to other uses; today only four are left.5
Sanatoria were actually hybrids, a combination of two older
forms of institutional' care for two quite different medical
problems. Like pest houses, which had existed for hundreds of
years to isolate people with communicable diseases, sanatoria
segregated consumptives in facilities outside the cities, thereby
removing the sources of infection and protecting their families and
fellow citizens. Like mental institutions, which had since the
1840s advocated the importance of a therapeutic environment,
sanatoria were places apart, usually in a rural setting, which
would heal merely by healthful locations and orderly living
arrangements. There was, then, nothing really revolutionary about
sanatoria, and they were quickly accepted as at least part of the
answer to the terrifying mystery of tuberculosis. Their numbers
grew quickly in the first twenty years of the new century; in
Connecticut, for example, there were none in 1900 and seven in
1921.6
since
4Although  the incidence of the disease had been declining
mid-nineteenth century without any effective medicaltreatment. This point will be discussed more fully in chapter I.
50ne  in each of the following states: Florida, California,
Texas and Hawaii. Deborah S. Pinkney;"Florida  Panel:
Hospital Open --
Keep TB
But at Half Capacity, l1 American Medical News 35
(March 2, 1992).
'Two  of these were private,
in Wallingford.
Wildwood  in Hartford and Gaylord
Cedarcrest
The remainder were public, provided by the state:
(Norwich),
(Hartford), Undercliff (Meriden), Uncas-on-Thames
Laurel Heights (Shelton), The Seaside (Niantic). State
institutions are listed in Connecticut Register and Manual (Hart-
ford: State of Connecticut, 1920),  p. 314.
5It is important to remember that sanatoria appeared at the
same time that traditional modes of medical care were beginning to
give way to highly technological institution-based treatment. The
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advent of effective anesthesia and asepsis  and improvement in
surgical techniques persuaded more and more middle class patients
to agree to be treated in general hospitals rather than their own
homes. This development was welcomed eagerly by physicians, as it
made their practices more efficient when they could visit many
patients at the same time in the hospital instead of going from
house to house.7 As this paper will show, sanatoria relieved
general hospitals of unwelcome chronically ill consumptives and
thus made them more attractive to middle class, paying patients.
The first fifteen years of the twentieth century is generally
known as the "progressive era." - It was a time of intensive
immigration and industrialization, of transition from social forms
and institutions appropriate to small town face-to-face life to
those required by urban mass society. Problems that had been
manageable by informal means when they involved a few individuals
required new solutions when hundreds or thousands of people were
affected. The reforms of the period were carried out by experts
7For the emergence of modern hospitals and medical practice,
see Charles E. Rosenberg,
Books, 1987),
The Care of Stransers (New York: Basic
especially chapters 7 - 12; Paul Starr, The Social
Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books,
especially Book One, chapters 3 - 5; Morris J. Vogel
1982),
Politics and Medical Care:
Century,"
The City Hospital at the TL
in The Theraneutic  Revolution: Essavs in t:
Historv of American Medicine, eds. Vogel and Charles E.
(Philadelphia:
175.
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979),
6who had received formal training in the specific issues involved.
These new professionals relied upon bureaucratic measures to
implement and manage change so that it was replicable and uniform
from place to place; they strove for efficiency so that the
improvements could be accomplished quickly and applied widely.
They thought government was the only source of manpower and funds
large enough to carry out the programs they developed. Governing
bodies, respondingtotheirlobbying, began to assume responsibili-
ties for social programs and to legislate upon matters previously
unregulated.8
All these transformations in the way social services were to
be provided were reflected in the acceptance of sanatoria as
logical and necessary places in which to treat consumptives. Care
was routinized and carried out by physicians and attendants who
specialized in the disease. Financial support for the operation
of these new institutions, especially when they served people not
able to pay for themselves, was more problematic, but generally was
assumed by a variety of governmental sources.
THEORETICAL ISSUES
It is surprising that few social historians have studied
sanatoriag because such research might provide insight into the
81 have in mind a broad range of government (at all levels)
interest in previously unregulated areas: child labor laws,
inspections, health department rules etc.
school
'1 am aware of only two, Bates and Bryder. Bates' work
concerns Dr. Lawrence Flick's career as a tuberculosis specialist
in Philadelphia, where he founded a sanatorium, and contains richly
detailed descriptions of what it was like to be a worker or a
patient there. Bryder is British, and although her book contains
7forces which shaped the institutional response to social problems
so typical of the progressive period. Hartford is an ideal site
for such an investigation. At the turn of the century it was a
modest but rapidly growing community with a history of philan-
thropic responsiveness to civic problems. Although lacking the
resources of large mercantile centers such as Boston or New York,
as the state capital it attracted sophisticated business, legal and
public policy professionals, experienced medical practitioners,
innovative manufacturers and learned educators. The population
also included large numbers of new immigrants, skilled artisans,
and white collar workers. Both people with problems and people
with solutions were abundantly present.
‘.
By examining Hartford and the changing place its sanatorium,
Wildwood, occupied in civic consciousness between 1900 (Wildwood
opened in 1902) and 1910 (when the first state sanatorium opened),
this study documents changing ideas about what kind of institution
physicians, politicians andphilanthropiststhoughtwas appropriate
for the treatment of tubercular patients who were unable to finance
their own care. Questions I have kept in mind include the
following: What were the alternatives to building an entire new
excellent analyses of sanatorium life and the social effects of the
diagnosis upon patients and their families, its applicability to
the American scene will not be clear until much more work is done
here. Barbara Bates, Bargaining for Life: A Social Historv of
Tuberculosis, 1876 - 1938 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1992) and "Quid pro Quo in Chronic Illness: Tuberculo-
sis in Pennsylvania, 1876 - 1926"  in Framina Disease: Studies in
Cultural History, eds. Charles E. Rosenberg and Janet Golden (New
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992),  pp. 229-47. Linda
Bryder, Below the Magic Mountain: A Social Historv of Tuberculosis
in Twentieth-Century Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
i1
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8medical facility on the outskirts of town? What were the political
or economic factors that affected that decision? Once the
sanatorium was functioning, why was there a change in the attitude
of those who had favored its construction?
At a more theoretical level, this paper uses the Hartford
instance to illustrate and test propositions made by historians
which hold that social control was central to the progressive
impulse.lO The concept of a special institution, the sanatorium,
to educate and treat patients considered to be dangerous to public
welfare is certainly quintessential progressive thought. In
Hartford, a sanatorium was built because existing hospitals did not
wish to accommodate tubercular patients. When the small facility
attached to Hartford Hospital proved insufficient to relieve it of
those unwanted patients, its administrators gladly transferred
responsibility for them to the state.
Although individual consumptives whose families were unable :
to care for them had little choice but to accept whatever help was
available, could those representing the interests of people
loThe  classic statement of the social control thesis is found
in Authur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Proqressivism (Illi-
nois: Harlan Davidson Inc., 1983),  pp. 67-104, and Robert H.
Wiebe, The Search for Order (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).
Helpful summary articles include: Blaine A. Brownell, "Interpre-
tations of Twentieth-Century Urban Progressive Reform" in Reform
and Reformers in the Proaressive Era, eds David R. Colburn and
George E. Pozzetta (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1983),  pp. 3-23;
Richard Crockatt, "The Progressive Era and its Discontents",
Journal of American Studies 17 (December 1983): 437-42; Wayne K.
Hobson, "Professionals, Progressives and Bureaucratization: A
Reassessment", The Historian 39 (August 1977): 639-58; David M.
Kennedy, "Overview: The Progressive Eraw, The Historian 37 (May
1975): 453-68.
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9affected by measures intended for their betterment (working class
and impoverished consumptives and their families) negotiate and
alter the shape those measures took?= One of the tuberculosis
commissioners appointed by the governor of Connecticut in 1907 came
from a working class family. He began by supporting the local
sanatorium and ended by overseeing the implementation of the state
system, probably because he thought it a more certain source of
care for those in need. Like Hartford Hospital administrators, he
saw the state system as the most palatable alternative, and
accepted it as a given that tuberculous patients required institu-
tionalization.
The Hartford case, then, does not question the premise that ".*,Z r
progressive reformers attempted to regulate and restrict the
actions of populations they defined as lldangerous,"  immigrants and
the urban poor, especially if they were also consumptive.
Hartford's physicians and policy makers resembled "reforming
professionals" and "coercive progressives, w who were sure that a
better society would result if only others would comply with what
they identified as correct behavior and wished to Vfimpose their own
ways of living upon other racial and ethnic groups'*. 12 At the
same time, however, events in Hartford also demonstrate that what
appears to have been a single decision, to institute a system of
"This  question is suggested by John D. Buenker's  investiga-
tion of negotiations and coalition building between progressive
politicians and their working class constituents. See Buenker,
Urban Liberalism and Progressive  Reform (New York: Scribner, 1973).
12Link and McCormick, pp. 85, 95.
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state sanatoria, was in fact the outcome of a series of decisions %k.>?-.
made within the constraints of a local historical context but at
the same time responsive to changing political, economic and
medical reality. Progressive reform was a dynamic process of
experiment, not the result of static bureaucratic fiat.
ORGANIZATION OF PAPER
Chapter I summarizes the literature of American tuberculosis .*.
professionals (physicians, nurses, social workers) between 1900 and
the first world war. It suggests that controlling "dangerous**  and
V1viciousll consumptives was very much part of the agenda of the
, medical community. In this sanatoria were little different from
other institutions in the progressive era. Mental asylums and
prisons also were places in which coercion could replace treatment;
in them as in sanatoria there was a significant amount of 'institu- j
tionalized repression, an Wnholy  alliance between reformist'!
conscience and administrative convenience."13
1
Despite benevo- !'
lent motives and ideology, medicalization of the behavior of ,
society's misfits did not always (or even usually) make their lives
comfortable. To the extent that poor consumptives were identified 1 I
as deviants who irresponsibly endangered others, they were ,r
subjected to treatment which, although seldom deliberately
i
inhumane, frequently lacked sensitivity.14
Ii
13Andrew Scull, Social Order/Mental Disorder: Analo-American
Psvchiatrv in Historical Perspective.
California Press, 1989),  p. 256.
(Berkeley: University of
14Discussions  of forces shaping mental and penal institutions
and of medicine as an instrument of social control can be found in:
John C. Burnham, "Medical Specialists and Movements Toward Social
11
Chapter II surveys the Hartford of 1900 to 1910 and identifies
sources of assistance and care available to those who could not
afford private medical treatment. Although the city had long
contained a number of institutions for the care of various
categories of unfortunates, it lacked a municipal hospital. As the
remainder of the paper demonstrates, the lack of a facility already
charged with the care of people such as the consumptive poor forced .!,
philanthropic and municipal authorities to grapple directly with
the problem they presented.
Richard Wiebe's  comment that g1the heart of progressivism was
the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its destiny  through
bureaucratic means"15 finds validation in the phenomenon  of the
sanatoria. How could an illness be more bureaucratized than by
dedicating a whole new system of quasi-hospitals to it? Chapter
III focusses  upon Hartford Hospital and its sanatorium. It reveals
that, after attempting to treat tubercular patients at a hospital-
run sanatorium, Hartford professionals concerned with tuberculosis
did not object to the construction of a system of state sanatoria.
Transferring destitute consumptives to state hospitals freed :, I
Control in the Progressive Era: Three Examples,'* in Building the
Orsanizational Societv, ed. Jerry Israel (New York:, The Free
Press, 1972),  pp. 19-30; Gerald N. Grob, "Rediscovering Asylums:
The Unhistorical History of the Mental Hospital,*'  in The Therapeu-
tic Revolution: Essays in the Social History of American Medicine,
eds. Morris J. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg (Philadelphia:
UniVerSity  of Pennsylvania Press, 1979),  pp. 136-57; David J.
Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asvlum and its Alterna-
tives in Proaressive America (USA: Harper Collins, 1980); Scull,
Social Order/Mental Disorder.
15Wiebe,  p. 166.
^
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Hartford Hospital beds for middle-class, paying patients. In this,
the hospital was in main stream of early twentieth century hospital
development and became (and has remained) a technologically
sophisticated acute care institution.
The extent to which even powerless and destitute patients
controlled their own destinies in the face of concerted efforts to
institutionalize them is most evident in their unwillingness to .'a
accept hospitalization at all. (Illustrated in the medical
literature reviewed in Chapter I.r6 ) Such individual resistance
was insufficient to change policy, however, and the ability of such
people to combine to exert political power was limited. Neverthe-
less, some evidence for what Buenker calls "coalition building" in
Hartford does exist. Chapter IV relates what is known of John
Gunshanan, a politically well connected son of a working class
Irish immigrant who at first promoted Hartford Hospital's Wildwood
Sanatorium and then advocated the construction of state sanatoria.
Since none of his personal papers have survived, it is not certain
why he and his constituency came to favor state rather than local
facilities. It may be that state institutionalization was a way
to avoid tuberculosis wards in a city hospital located in the
stigmatized almshouse, admission to which was resisted by the
working poor and destitute alike. In addition, the future of
sanatoria run by general hospitals was not hopeful; Hartford
Hospital's commitment to Wildwood  was less than enthusiastic.
161t is also a major theme addressed by. Bates in both her
short paper and monograph.
13
Information aboutwhatmaneuvers  were necessary  or what coalitions
were built to ensure legislative approval of and appropriations for
state sanatoria has not survived. That five hospitals were built!,  ;
f--l?
in ten years is-proof of Gunshanan 's success and supports Buenker's  / (.
suggestion that the acted-upon could sometimes affect their own i
destinies.
This paper concentrates upon sanatorium care for the working
poor and the destitute because in the eyes of progressive reformers
and medical professionals they threatened the health of the larger
community in ways that middle class consumptives did not, and
because the institutions to which they  were sent, unlike Trudeau's
.establishment at Saranac or Mann's in Maqic Mountain, were not
hWUriOUS  retreats into either health or an aesthetic death. We
have forgotten what happened to the needy consumptives of urban
America, and have forgotten what the places in which they were
confined were like. Unfortunately, almost all traces of their . .
voices have been lost in Hartford. Their families did not deposit
their letters or diaries, if any existed, at the historical
society. They did not publish memoirs in their successful and
comfortable old age. No newspaper or magazine reporters visited
them for material for "human interest** stories. The Medical
Records Department of HartfordHospitaldenies  ever having received
their medical records. All that is left of such people are a few
trails among bureaucratic records; the story of one of those
families, the Barbellas, is recounted as part of Chapter III. The
.Barbellas, whose hopeful beginnings in the new land ended in
J
14
tuberculosis and death in public.institutions,  will have to stand
for a myriad of others. This paper is dedicated to the memory of
all of them.
15
CHAPTER I
TUBERCULOSIS AND SANATORIA. 1900 - 1915
Tuberculosis at the turn of the century was in many ways a new
entity. Koch's 1882 discovery of the causative bacillus redefined'.
it as infectious rather than inherited, as had been thought
previously. By 1900, the germ theory was widely accepted, ' but
it took some time for its implications for the treatment of
tuberculosis to affect medical practice and social policy. The
emerging discipline of public health would undertake the prevention
and control of tuberculosis as one of its central missions. Public
health authorities were not concerned about those already ill
except insofar as they could infect others. Sanatoria fit into
their plan as places in which to educate patients about how to lead :
healthful lives, and, more importantly, as places in which to :
isolate the contagious.
The early years of this century were also a time of great
change in medicine and medical practice. The general hospital
became the workshop of the physician and the locus of training for
medical professionals. Physicians began to base their practices
in hospitals, efficient and convenient places in which to treat
as a result, hospitals began.to  accommodate middle andpatients;
upper class patients as well as (though in different wings from) T3‘.*-5
'Nancy Tomes, *'The Private Side of Public Health: Sanitary
Science, Domestic Hygiene, and the Germ Theory, 1870 - 1900,'*
Bulletin of the History of Medicine 64 (Winter 1990): 509-39.
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control in hospitals and operating rooms made them safer, general
anesthesia technology became widespread. All this meant that
hospitals were no longer merely places in which medical personnel
supported patients while nature cured them, but in addition became
.arenas of active intervention, especially  as effective surgical
procedures evolved.2
The need to treat an incurable but dangerous disease such as .!I
tuberculosis did not fit the emerging acute care hospital  model.
The function of the new sanatoria was to isolate contagious people,
but they were actually run like mental institutions, an observation
never made
researcher
the mental
problems and solutions in dealing with long-term patients, many of
whom were unwillingly institutionalized, were similar. The
importance of a therapeutic environment (including a proper rural
site and details of building construction), the moralism inherent
in the process by which patients were selected and admitted, the
perceived need for a strong charismatic physician-director, the
staffing problems and use of patient labor, the lack of definitive
2For  the emergence of modern hospitals and medical practice,
see Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Stranqers  (New York: Basic
Books, 1987), especially chapters 7 - 12; Paul Starr, The Social
Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982),
especially Book One, chapters 3 - 5; Morris J. Vogel, "Machine
Politics and Medical Care: The City Hospital at the Turn of the
Century," in The Therapeutic Revolution: Essavs in the Social
History  of American Medicine, eds. Vogel and Charles E. Rosenberg
P* of PA Press, 1979),  pp. 159 - 175.
by tuberculosis professionals but obvious to
. There is no space here for a comparative
asylum and the sanatorium; sufficient to note
the modern
history of
that basic
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cure -- all these were common to both kinds of institution.3
Gerald Grob points out that most patients in mental asylums were
there because of an "absence of alternatives" for custodial care. 4
The same could be said of sanatoria.
Duringthe years between Edward Trudeau 's establishment of his
Adirondack Cottage Sanatorium (1885) and the First World War,
physicians, nurses and social workers active in the sanatorium i .'I
.movement published many professional papers in which they described
new physical plants and treatment modalities, debated admission
policies, reported solutions to staffing problems, tabulated
outcome data, and lobbied for legislative action., Drawing on this
professional literature, this chapter describes sanatoria and the
care given inthemto provide background for the following chapters
about tuberculosis in Hartford. It suggests that a kind of
syllogism emerged: People with advanced tuberculosis were ,i ,_
dangerous because they were more infectious than they had been in I..
the earlier stages; poor people were more likely to wait to seek
medical attention until their disease was in its late stages;
therefore, poor consumptives were dangerous to society. This chain
of reasoning affected both medical and public policy.
3See Nancy Tomes, A Generous Confidence: Thomas Storv
Kirkbride and the Art of Asylum-keeoinq, 1840 - 1883 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
4Gerald Grob, "Rediscovering Asylums: The Unhistorical
History of the Mental Hospital,11  in Therapeutic Revolution, eds.
Morris J. Vogel ad Charles E. Rosenberg (Philadelphia: Univrsity
ofpennsylvania  Press, 1979),  p. 151.
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As physicians devoted much effort to classifying patients by
stage of disease, some came to advocate involuntary admission to
sanatoria for people with advanced disease who did not obey their
dictates about the proper ways consumptives should‘live. It proved
impossible to identify and selectively admit patients in specific
disease stages and few states actually enacted laws which permitted
health authorities to lock up very ill people. Nevertheless, the
, _
,  .
literature reviewed here, written by middle class professionals
treating consumptives, indicates that they feared,poorer,  sicker
patients and promoted residential care for them in part as a
measure to remove them from the community.
TUBERCULOSIS TREXL'MEN?!
Although tuberculosis mortality in the United States peaked
before 1830 and began to decline after 1880,5 the disease
remained a major cause of death until the post World War II
antibiotic era. In 1908 the death rate from tuberculosis was
conservatively calculated at142 per 100,000, or around one in nine
deaths from all causes.6 Peak mortality tended to occur in the
most productive working and child bearing years: For people in the
'Harry F. Dowling, Fishtins  Infection (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977),  p. 71.
%rving  Fisher, "The Cost of Tuberculosis in the United States
and Its Reduction," Transactions of the Sixth International
Congress on Tuberculosis (Philadelphia:
1908) Volume III, pp. 6 - 7.
William F. Fell Co.,
Sixth Congress 1908.
This congress hereafter footnoted as
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third decade of life, tuberculosis was responsible for one death
in three.'
Tuberculosis did not kill quickly. Morbidity figures showed
that the disease had great social and economic costs; one expert
estimated that death occurred after an average of three years of
disability.8 Calculating the drain on the economy from lost wages
and costs of care, theoreticians arrived at staggering numbers.
In 1908, the "average cost in actual money of a death from
tuberculosis** was multiplied by the number of annual tuberculosis
deaths to yield a cost to the nation per year of $l,lOO,OOO,OOO.g
Whatever we may think of the accuracy of such figures, they
indicate the felt urgency of the need to stop the spread of the
disease.
That tuberculosis was a disease of the poor was considered
obvious: **Consumption is the most certain of the numerous
blessings of the poor," said one physician, who also reminded his
readers that tuberculosis death rates varied directly with social
position.iO The most effective treatment for working class pa-
'Ibid., p. 13.
81bid.
'Ibid., p. 34. This author notes (p. 20) that the annual wage
for an unskilled male worker was $300 -- a dollar a working day.
"Woods  Hutchinson, 'IThe Relation Between Income and Tubercu-
losis,ll Sixth Congress, 1908 Volume III p. 717.
Physicians occasionally acknowledged that it was also possible
for wealthy people to be infected by the bacillus and to be problem
patients. According to a tuberculosis specialist in a resort town,
the affluent consumptive had difficulty learning to live a healthy
life because of an unwillingness to "give up his favorite indul-
gences." Charles L. Minor, "The Treatment of Tuberculosis Patients
Q  I
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tients, he went on, would be a ten percent increase in wages:
II . ..the consumptive can, roughly speaking, buy as many chances of
living as he is able to afford."ll I
Urban working class families lived on between nine and
eighteen dollars a week and tended not to use free dispensaries
because they could not afford the wages lost if they took time off
to do so. Sanatorium care cost between ten and twenty dollars a
week, a sum impossible for such workers to afford. If illness of
.the primary wage earner, usually the husband, forced the wife to
provide for the family alone, weekly income fell to an average of
around four dollars -- not enough for minimal food and shelter,
especially if there were children in the family. 12
Many experts published regimens for providing sanatorium-type
care at home, l3 but even this was almost impossible to carry out
in an overcrowded tenement apartment. Minimal requirements, that
the patient have a bed to him or herself located near a window and
should spend as much time as possible outdoors (on the tenement
in their Homes and in Places Other Than Sanatoriums," Sixth
Conqress 1908 Volume I Part II, pp. 1013-27.
llHutchinson, pp. 718 - 9.
12Sherman C. Kingsley, 'IThe Burdens Entailed by Tuberculosis
on Individuals and Families," Sixth Conqress, 1908 Volume III pp.
47 - 52.
13Lawrence Flick, "Diagnosis and Treatment of Early Cases of
Tuberculosis," Sixth Conqress 1908 Volume I Part II pp. 631 - 8;
Thomas D. Coleman, "The Treatment of Tuberculosis Patients in Their
Homes and Places Other Than Sanatoriums," Sixth Conqress 1908
VOhUne I Part II pp. 1030 - 41; Minor, p. 1020; Edward 0. Otis,
"Home Treatment of Tuberculosis Either in Favorable or Unfavorable
Climates," First Meetinq NASPTB (New York: Irving Press, 1906),
PP. 389 - 98.
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roof if there was no yard), were difficult to achieve for the
poor.14
By the turn of the century, efforts had begun to contain the
disease. Public health authorities in large cities began to
require physicians to report tuberculosis cases in part so that
patients could be supervised in their communities. l5 New York
City's Health Department lead the country in developing such a
program, monitoring and assisting the poor via a dispensary system
with nurses and medical inspectors to visit those without private
physicians. Consumptives and their families were taught to carry
i
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out a program of care which consisted of rest, fresh air and good
food. They were also supplied with free "sanitary cuspidors" to
dispose of sputum, and sometimes given food supplements (milk and
eggs) . l6 All these services were intended for the poor. The New
York City Board of Health did not send visitors to people who had
14Coleman,  p. 1031 - 2.
15This  was called "notification, I1 and it was a long struggle
before private physicians cooperated with city health departments.
Issues and strategies were complex and are well summarized by
Daniel M. Fox, l'Social Policy and City Politics: Tuberculosis
Reporting in New York, 1889 - 1900, 'I Bulletin of the History of
Medicine 49 (Spring 1975): 169 - 195.
16Developed  first in New York, such programs were .copied
elsewhere. Most included a wide range of activities -- statistics-
gathering, public education, inspection of lodging houses,
disinfection of apartments vacated by tuberculous  people, anti-
spitting regulations, etc. For contemporary descriptions, see:
Herman Biggs, 'IThe Administrative Control of Tuberculosis in New
York City," Sixth Conaress 1908 Volume IV Part I pp. 198 - 202;
Samuel Dixon, "The Government Control of Tuberculous  Patients  in
Pennsylvania," Sixth Conqress 1908 Volume IV Part I pp. 232 - 9;
Marshall Langton  Price, "The  Statutory Control of Tuberculosis,
with Special Reference to the Maryland System," Sixth Congress 1908
Volume IV Part I pp. 209 - 19.
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private physicians, assuming that physicians would "see that the
necessary precautions are taken to prevent the transmission of the
disease to others" for consumptives regularly under their care.l'
Whether at home or in the sanatorium, the basic rules were the
same. The patient must expectorate into a container which could
be disinfected or burned; as much time as possible was to be spent
outdoors; there must be "an abundance of wholesome food"; the
patient should be kept warm; surroundings should be cheerful; and
finally, there should be "constant medical supervision.V118 While
the physician was to be "determined and forceful,V1  the ideal
patient was "intelligent, earnest and obedient.qtlg
Although home care was all that would be available for most
consumptives, tuberculosis workers felt sanatoria offered better
discipline, fresher air and other patients to provide motivation
and companionship.20 Sanatoria were to be "educational centers"
to "teach a proper mode of life to the community in general and the
consumptive in particular . . . [and to spread] the gospel of a life
in pure air as the only proper mode of life....It21
Another reason such professionals advocated sanatorium care
was to isolate people they thought were most contagious. Since
17Biggs,  p. 199.
181bid.,  p. 1033.
"Minor, p. 1014.
20Minor,  p. 1019.
21Theodore Sachs, "Local Sanatoriums and Tuberculosis,"
Charities 16 (May 26, 1906): 282.
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production of infectious sputum increases as the disease progress-
es, and since poor people tended not to present themselves for care
until they were too sick to work, many cases among the working
classes and indigent were advanced. Tuberculosis workers identi-
f,ied  such people as dangerous to others, most of all to their own
families but also to fellow workers and middle class employers.
A nurse described the risk to a middle class family when their
laundress was part of a consumptive household:
Consider . . . the incurable or careless consumptive in a
home where laundry . . . is the main source of income . . . .
in winter there must be only one fire, that usually in
the kitchen, and often we find the bed of the patient
moved into this room . . . . The family launder clothes,
which are often placed upon this bed before being put
into the baskets or parcels to be returned to th,s
owners, who in turn place them . . . on their own beds.
Another observer framed "The Negro Tuberculosis Problem" in terms
of its threat to white people:
The problem of the negro is too intimately bound up with
the life of the white man to be neglected or ignored.
The negro washerwoman, nursemaids3 cook and domestic
servant are everywhere present....
These authors lobbied for institutions in which to place the
terminally ill consumptive for the protection of the community. I'
SANATORIA
The campaign against tuberculosis in the United States was
waged and coordinated by the National Association for the Study and
22S H. Cabaniss, "Hospital Care
Incurabl'e  Cases of Consumption,
for the Advanced and
It Sixth Consress, 1908 Volume III p.
543.
23t1The  Negro Tuberculosis Problem,l'  The Modern Hospital 4 (May
1915) : 349.
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Prevention of Tuberculosis (hereafter NASPTB), organized in
1904. 24 The NASPTB never promoted sanatoria as sufficient to
:
I
treat the consumptive and control the spread of the disease.
Nevertheless, sanatoria were key elements in the anti-TB crusade.
They provided a means of safeguarding the rest of society by
isolating peoplethoughtto be most contagious, those with advanced
1 disease. At the same time, physicians, needing arenas in which to
demonstrate their science , promoted sanatoria as edifying and
healthful settings for those with potentially curable early
disease. The ever growing number of sanatorium beds was visible
and dramatic evidence of the commitment of philanthropic and/or
public funds to the control of tuberculosis.25
24Historians  of medicine and the progressive era identify the
NASPTB as the prototype of a new form of voluntary organization
focused on a specific disease.
medical,
Concerned people, medical and non-
formed local groups which were linked together in regional
and national networks. The activities of the NASPTB were many --
educating the public, lobbying for governmental funding, soliciting
public and philanthropic giving (the Christmas Seal campaign),
providing direct patient services, etc.
For the NASPTB's  place in the history of medicine and the
progressive era, see John C. Burnham "Medical Specialists and
Movements Toward Social Control in the Progressive Era:
Examples,"
Three
(New York:
in Buildinqthe Organizational Society ed. Jerry Israel
The Free Press, 1972),  pp. 19 - 3O*'Dowling  Fiahtinq
Infection; Richard H. Shryock,
Tuberculosis Movement,"
"The  Historical Slgnificanke
in Medicine in America (Baltimore:
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Throughout the early years of the century, states, counties,
cities, private charities and profit -seeking medical entrepreneurs
continued to construct sanatoria. Their numbers increased
dramatically, from twelve in 1899 to 536 in 1g25.26 They
included experiments such as a *'Workmen's  Sanatorium for Workers'*
supported by The Workmen's Circle of a "radical  class of Jewish
workingmen" (some labor unions attempted similar facil-
ities). A few employers, such as the Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company, erected sanatoria for their own staffs.2g The
Pacific States Telephone Company was willing  to pay for treatment
26Teller,  p. 82; David J. Rothman  and, Eileen A. Tynan,
"Advantages and Disadvantages of Special Hospitals for Patients
with HIV Infections, I1 New England Journal of Medicine 323 (Septem-
ber 13, 1990): 765. This does not count many small boarding houses
which served consumptive patients and contributed the sleeping
porch to American vernacular architecture. For an excellent
illustrated discussion of such establishments, see Philip Gallos,
Cure Cottaqes of Saranac Lake (Saranac Lake NY: Historic Saranac
Lake, 1988).
Sanatoria came inmany architectural forms, from tent colonies
to multi-storied pavilions, depending upon locat+on  and-moneys
available. A fascinating topic in itself, it is o;;I;d;n gz
purview of this paper. Many editions of The Modern Hosn
teens contain floor plans and photographs of new or proposed
sanatoria. Physicians had definite ideas of proper construction
methods and plans as well. See, for example, Herbert C. Clapp,
"The Function of Municipal Governments in Licensing Private
Sanatoriums for Tuberculosis, I* Sixth Conqress 1908 Volume IV Part
I pp. 253 - 61; Arnold Klebs, "Economic and Efficient Construc-
tion," Fifth Meetina-, NASPTB (Philadelphia: William F. Fell Co.,
1909),  pp. 126 - 141.
27Hyman Strunsky, "A Workmen's Sanatorium for Workers," Survey
34 (May 29, 1915): 196 - 8.
28Lee  K. Frankel, "Insurance against Tuberculosisrl'  Sixth
Meetins  NASPTB (Philadelphia: William Fell Co., 1910),  p. 36.
2gIbid.
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for at least a few workers,30 but this sort of an investment in
employee health seems to have .been rare in this period. Most
facilities with more than a few beds, however, were operated by
cities, counties or states. Placing ultimate responsibility for
the care of indigent consumptives upon public officials was
characteristic of mainstream progressive thought, which identified
government as the only source of administrative control and funding
large enough to be able to carry out public welfare programs.
Voluntary associations such as the NASPTB identified and sometimes
initiated model services and programs, but were reluctant.or  unable
to preside over their proliferation.31 Public sanatoria were
variously funded by cities, counties or states; the distribution
of responsibility varied from place to place and over time as more
and more facilities were built.
The first state sanatorium opened in 1899 in Rutland,
Massachusetts. Herbert Clapp, its medical director, wanted to
limit admission to patients who were tough, cheerful, intelligent,
possessed "the right moral stamina," and whose symptoms had first
appeared within the past three months: 32 The privilege of
treating only people with early disease was to be granted to few
30Richard C. Cabot, "Areguipa Sanatorium, 'I Survey  29 (December
7, 1912): 313.
31Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Prosressivism
(Arlington Heights IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1983) p. 87.
32Herbert C. Clapp, What Cases are Suitable for Admission to
a State Sanatorium for Tuberculosis,
First Meeting NASPTB (New York:
Especially in New England?"
Irving Press, 1906),  p. 344 - 5.
27
sanatorium administrators. Public sanatoria had to admit advanced
patients because people with end stage disease were often unable
to afford private care. A 1909 survey revealed that only nine per
cent of institutions which accepted advanced cases were self
supporting,. while 54% of those which claimed to limit admissions
to l'incipients" were self-sustaining from fees.33
Even within the public sphere, there were attempts to make
each administrative level (state, county, city) responsible for
different patients. Debate about which patients should be cared
for where went on throughout the period. Resolution was different
in each state. Although it is difficult to generalize, a pattern
emerged whereby people with advanced disease were admitted to local
city or county institutions, while patients who were thought able
to recover were sent to state facilities. This was partly because
cities or counties had always been responsible for care of the
incurably ill in almshouses and poorhouses. There were also
economic considerations. Since it cost more to treat early cases,
facilities for their care had to be better funded, and there was
more money at the state level. The Department of Public Charities
in New York City calculated that advanced cases cost sixty one
cents per day per patient, as against a dollar a day per capita for
those in the early stages. The commissioner of the department
33A.  H. Garvin, "Improved Organization and Management," Fifth
Meetins  NASPTB (Philadelphia: William F. Fell Co., 1909), p. 142 -
3.
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explained that those in early stages needed more food, especially
eggs and milk.34
Patients were distributed among institutions differently in
different states, but the goal was always to separate them by
disease stage. Boston [City] Consumptives Hospital at Mattapan
consisted of a day-camp for ambulatory patients who had homes to
return to at night, a cottage-hospital for moderately advanced
patients, and a hospital for far-advanced or dying patients. The
state of Massachusetts operated a sanatorium at Rutland  for
llincipients.lI Pennsylvania admitted patients atall  stages to each
of its three sanatoria but housed them separately. The state of
Minnesota and cities of New York and Cleveland also had separate
public institutions for early and late stages.35
The primary goal was to keep the advanced patients away from
all others; indeed, for some tuberculosis professionals, the whole
34Homer Folks,
Tuberculosis,"
"Municipal Sanatorium for Incipient Cases of
Charities 11 (July 18, 1903): 71.
at Hartford Hospital was different; there,
The experience
it cost more to care for
the advanced cases in the hospital proper than for the incipients
in the sanatorium. See Chapter III, below.
35For  Massachusetts, Edwin A. Locke and Simon F. Cox, *'The
Municipal Hospital for Advanced Consumptives in Boston," Sixth
Congress 1908 Volume I part II, pp. 988-95; Clapp, "What Cases are
Suitable," p. 339; John B. Hawes, "The  Present Situation in Regard
to Local Tuberculosis Hospitals," Boston Medical and Sursical
Journal 193 (August 12, 1915): 251. For Pennsylvania, Karl
Schaeffle, "Pennsylvania an Example of the Advantages of State Wide
Control of Tuberculosis
17-21.
,I1 The Modern Hospital 10 (January 1918):
For Minnesota, H. Longstreet Taylor, "Advantages of State
Control Over Tuberculosis Hospitals, 'I The Modern Hospital 3 (July
1914): 35.
E. Ford,
For New York, Biggs, p. 200-01. For Cleveland, Clyde
Problem,
"The Responsibility of the City in the Tuberculosis
Seventh Meetins  NASPTB (Philadelphia:
1911),  p. 60.
William Fell Co.,
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reason for publicly supported institutions Was  to isolate advanced
patients. For example:
The advanced phthisis patient . . . in almost every
instance becomes . . . a danger to his family and a center
of contagion for his surroundings l . . . The unfortunate
sufferer . . . should no longer be left free to choose
whether or not he will leave his home, but should be
made to enter a hospital or sanatorium  . . . . the duty of
making sufficient provision for the great number of
advanced consumptives . . . should fall upon the state,
and it were well if the private hospital yith$%ew
entirely from the care of the advanced consumptive.
In reality, much of the discussion about disposition of
patients with varying degrees of tuberculosis was academic. Making
an accurate diagnosis of the stage of pulmonary tuberculosis was
quite difficult,37  and in fact, as will be seen below, most
sanatoria ended up with a mixture Of patients. Dr. Vaughan of
Detroit was unusually candid when he admitted that in his city,
patients in various stages were mixed in the same institution, a
practice for which he said he had been "criticized extensive-
ly."38 The important point is that the rhetoric of health care
professionals emphasized that it was possible and desirable to
recognize different stages of tuberculosis, and that patients in
the same stage should be housed together.
36Jacob H. Schiff, ~~Institutional Care for Early or for
Advanced Consumptives?" Sixth Conaress,  1908 pp. 362-3.
37Edward 0. Otis, "The Early Recognition of Tuberculosis", pp.
353 - 4. Apparatus to take x-rays and expertise to read them were
still rudimentary, as were laboratories to process and read sputum
samples;
381bid.
rSince tuberculosis cases identified as "advanced"
30
also
j
happened often to be urban poor people, the resultant corollary was
that they were feared as dangerous foci of infection. To tubercu-
losis workers, they were difficult to treat r1owing to their
. .
inability to put into practice customs and habits alien to all
their past training.n3g Tenement dwellers were not able to
maintain standards of personal cleanliness deemed necessary by
health professionals;*' often immigrants, their ethnic foods
. .
were not identifiable to middle class observers as nutritious  and
they could not afford the amounts thought necessary. They
especially lacked those most important middle class characteris-
self control and willingness to obey their physicians. 41tics,
. . .
Physicians, nurses and social workers found It dxfflcult  to
distinguish between consumptives unable to care for themselves and
those unwilling to conform to middle class norms: 'I[T]he most
dangerous patients are those who are ignorant of the rudiments of
personal hygiene, or who have reached such an advanced stage
. . . [that] they have become helpless, and are unable to take care
. .
3gIbid.,  p. 1023.
*'Tomes, "The Private Side of Public Health." The perceived
connection between dirt, germs, disease and class are usefully tied
together in this paper and even more in the same author's Mss..
prepared for the 1991 meeting of the Organization of American
Historians, 'IThe Wages of Dirt Were Death: Women and Domestic
Hygiene, 1880 - 1930."
I
*lThe  ideal patient was even supposed to suppress his cough:
"It is remarkable how much this may be done by an effort of the
will . . . shown by the small amount of coughing to be heard in any
well-regulated tuberculosis sanatorium." Coleman, p. 1038.
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for [sic.] their expectoration. 1~42 Some middle class workers
thought poverty was synonymous with mental dullness. "The day-
laborer, the shop-girl, the drunken negro belong to a class that
. . . is unable to make use of what it learns."43 Furthermore,
People of this class are by nature weak, shiftless, and
lacking in initiative and in perseverance. They have
neither inherited nor acquired moral strength . . . and
they are often vicious besides. It takes a high grade
of moral fiber to maintain the persistent and long-drawn
struggle that must be kept up in fighting tuberculosi;;
and they have not the self-control necessary . . . .
amount of education in the laws of hygiene can give them
moral fiber, nor can they be tr4aqined  to exercise self-
control in time to do any good.
From accusation of lack of "moral strength I* to application of
the Qicious'l label was a short step. A New Haven physician
.recommended that as soon as consumptives were "thrown  upon public
charity," they should "be at once removed to a detention institu-
tion." Jail was the only appropriate placement for *'vicious"
consumptives who "intentionally defy the rules that have been
established for their control.n45 In the discussion which fol-
lowed, Qicious"  was defined by another physician: '*...the slum-
dweller, by which I mean the hopelessly idle, vicious, worthless
42C. D. Spivak, nIsolation  of Advanced Consumptivesll'
Charities 16 (May 26, 1096): 279.
43Ellen N. La Matte, "The Unteachable Consumptive," Sixth
Conqress 1908 Volume III p. 256.
441bid.,  p. 258.
45John P. C. Foster, nDetention  Institutions for Ignorant and
Vicious Consumptives," First Meetinq NASPTB (New York: Irving
Press, 1906),  pp. 334 - 7. It is probably not coincidental that
Foster was the executive director of a private sanatorium (Gaylord,
in Wallingford CT) who later chaired the commission which advocated
Connecticut's state sanatorium system.
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and uneducated poor.... w He suggested that state sanatoria were
appropriate only for the "worthy laboring class," since the
"uneducated poor " would "relapse into the filthy habits, unsanitary
methods of living, and vicious practices which have in the first
instance made them sick, and thus the money of the State will be
thrown away and the opportunities for cure and instruction of the
more worthy poor will be lessened. n46 Dr. Otis of Boston ex-
pressed a minority view when he said, ))... not all the poor
consumptive's are of the 'slummy'  character. They are decent
working people, many of them, and I do not think we should place
them in the same class as vicious consumptive. 8147
The identification of poor or indigent people as 'lother,Vt  who
.
were responsible for their own disease because they did not behave
in ways familiar to middle class reformers, is part of a nativist,
.xenophobic  perception of the world common in the United States at
the turn of the century. Echoes of it can be found throughout the
tuberculosis literature. The November 7, 1908 issue of Charities
.ran a series of articles about TB among Indians, Jews, Negroes,
Scandinavians, Sioux Indians, Italians and Irish. Readers learned
that [Native American] Indians ate from wooden and gourd dishes
that could not be properly cleaned, "spit freely'! on the sandy
46nGeneralDiscussion  of the Symposium,on  Sanatorium Treatment
and Other Papers,l' First Meetins  NASPTB (New York: Irving Press,
1906),  p. 403.
471bid.,  p. 404.
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floors of their dwellings, and generally led unsanitary lives.48
Jews had lower mortality rates because they had been city dwellers
for two thousand years and had adapted to the urban milieu.4g
Italians, accustomed to rural life, became ill and died rapidly
when exposed to strenuous work in dirty trades, repeated pregnan-
cies and insufficient food in urban environments. 50 Negroes
lived crowded together and had "pernicious sanitary habits," and
a "childish want of self-control."51 Scandinavians were intelli-
gent and moral and tended to settle in rural districts but VVdespise
fresh air . . . and live with the doors and windows closed." They
had a low general death rate but a relatively high tuberculosis
mortality rate.52  The Irish were l'hyper-susceptible" and had
@'hype-immunity )) because the 11race11  had not been long exposed to
tuberculosis.53 Another observer warned that ."Chinese,  Negroes,
Bohemians and Irish suffer more and are consequently a greater
48Ales Hrdlicka, "Tuberculosis in the Indian," Charities 21
(November 7, 1908): 245 - 7.
4gMaurice Fishberg, n[Tuberculosis]  Among the Jews," Charities
21 (November 7, 1908): 248.
50Antonio Stella, @'[Tuberculosis] Among the Italians,lq
Charities 21 (November 7, 1908): 248.
51Robert Wilson Jr, n[Tuberculosis] Among the Negroes,"
Charities 21 (November 7, 1908): 248.
52George Douglas Head, n[TuberculosisJ  Among the Scandina-
viansV1 Charities 21 (November 7, 1908) p 249
53Lawrence F. Flick, n[Tuberculosis] Among the Irish,"
Charities 21 (November 7, 1908): 249 - 50.
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menace . . . to the community than are the Jews and the Ital-
ians.V154  ' This sense that the illnesses of the poor were made
more dangerous by modes of living which made it easy for disease
to spread among them (and by implication throughout the entire
citizenry) was fostered by a shift in the attention of public
health'  authorities from environmental proj‘ects  such -as sewer
systems and clean drinking water to the control of specific
contagious diseases. As one public health official put it, "the
fight must be won, not by the construction of public works, but by
the conduct of the individual life." 55 Acceptance of the germ
theory brought with it much advise to the public, especially women,
about how to run healthy homes and raise strong children.
Cleanliness, both of the person and of the home, was promoted as
essential to disease prevention.56  The NASPTB's  extensive educa-
tion program stressing how people could protect themselves from
tuberculosis by living properly was part of the same change in
public health focus: A combination of nativism and the assumption
that the poor wilfully disregarded such attempts to teach them
simple measures to stay healthy underlay the "vicious consumptiveg*
label.
54Miss  Brandt, "Statistics on Tuberculosis,11  Charities 2 (July
25, 1903): 91 - 2.
55Charles E.A. Winslow, The Evolution and Significance of the
Modern Public Health Campaign (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1923),  p. 55. See also Barbara Rosenkrantz, Public Health and the
State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972),  Chapters 4, 5.
56Tomes, 'IThe Wages of Dirt Were Death."
If consumptives would not. accept institutionalization to
protect those around them, thought some physicians and legislators,
there should be laws to force them to do so. Compulsory isolation
or quarantine of those with communicable diseases had been
practiced since the early days of the republic. The former pest
houses, now communicable disease hospitals, however, were for
acutely infectious diseases such as smallpox, diphtheria and
typhoid and did not admit patients with tuberculosis.57  By 1910,
articles had begun to appear in medical journals reporting approv-
ingly upon a variety of government regulations which were to
restrict the movements of consumptives. Although some physicians
objected that this would merely lead to concealing the disease,
others argued for even more strict measures, among them the
"forcible removal, if necessary, of consumptives dangerous to the
public from disobedience or unavoidable overcrowding.1158 BY
1912, New Jersey and Maryland had statutes which permitted their
boards of health to obtain a court order to commit any offender
against the tuberculosis rules and regulations.5g  The physician
reportinguponthis legislation recommendedthatcompulsory removal
and detention should be available to health officers whenever
57Harry F. Dowling, "Patients Behind Glass Walls: The History
of the Chicago Municipal Contagious Disease Hospital," Journal of
the Historv of Medicine and Allied Sciences 40 (October 1985): 440
- 443.
58Dixon,  p. 233; Victor Vaughan, "Tuberculosis Legislation,"
Fifth Meetina NASPTB (Philadelphia: William F. Fell Co., 1909),
PP. 44-45, 54.
5gBertram Waters, "Adequate Hospital Control," Eishth  Meetinq
NASPTB (Philadelphia: William F. Fell Co., 1912),  p. 248.
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a. There is refusal to comply with sanitary regulations.
b. Unsanitary home conditions exist.
c. The patient is of vicious character and habits.
d. Others, especially children, are exposed to infection.
e. The patient, or the family, are public charges or dependent
upon charitable aid.
Furthermore, such detention should be permanent if necessary.60
In the discussion which followed his paper, most colleagues
agreed with the necessity for compulsory removal, though several
qualified their statements with expressions of concern that the
power not be abused: "we have no right to legislate against a
consumptive because he is dependent," said one.61 Others noted
that the power to admit a patient to a sanatorium against his will
did not always carry with it the authority to keep him there --
some homeless men had been in the New York' City tuberculosis
hospitals twelve times in as many months.62 In 1915, bills
permitting involuntary committal were being .considered  in five
states and the District of Columbia.63
In Massachusetts and probably other states as well, local
health officials were able to institutionalize "incorrigible
consumptives" even without specific state regulations permitting
them to do so. Health officers simply assumed more power "in
601bid.,  pp. 248 - 9. The list is presented in this form in
the original. Waters makes an attempt to safeguard the patient
when he suggests that, if bacilli do not appear on a sputum smear,
the diagnosis should be confirmed by "two competent examiners."
611bid.,  p. 252. Discussion following Waters' paper.
621bid.,  p. 256. Discussion following Waters' paper.
6311Tuberculosis  Laws ,*I The Modern Hospital 4 (April 1915): 274
- 5. I was unable to discover how many of them were passed.
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certain cases when the health of the community is at stake than the
strict letter of the law allows them to,n64 reported a Boston
physician proudly. Such assumption of authority seems never to
have been openly challenged. There were other methods -- recipi-
ents of public aid could be cut off from payments until they
reformed, for example.65 Unfortunately, as a physician in charge
of a state institution pointed out, such patients were not welcomed
in sanatoria or hospitals with "willing patients;" they often
remained "incorrigible" and had to be discharged back to their
communities.66
THE SANATORIUM EXPERIENCE
Papers written by care givers never described the sanatorium
patient's actual experience. They occasionally provided readers
with accounts of daily routine, usually described as alternating
periods of eating and resting with occasional mild activity.67
We must therefore make inferences about everyday life in sanatoria
and how patients felt about being there by reading between the
lines of papers discussing other matters.68
64Edward 0. Otis, et. al. I'How May the Best Results Be
Obtained in the Care of the Incorrigible Consumptive in Towns Where
There Are No Hospitals?" American Journal of Public Health 4
(December 1914): 1205.
651bid.
661bid.,  pp. 1206 - 8. Discussion of Otis' paper.
,
67Locke and Cox, p. 994.
68Barbara Bates, Barsainins for Life: A Social Historv of
Tuberculosis, 1876 - 1938 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1992) is an excellent secondary source for such
descriptions. She had access to the personal papers, including
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While some private institutions could be resort-like,
parsimonious officials usually saw to it that public sanatoria were
starkly utilitarian. Even the site sometimes had to be chosen on
grounds of availability and economy. Chicago's first tuberculosis
camp (the aim of which was to demonstrate how little money had to
be spent to achieve health for incipient patients) was built on the
same property as the almshouse and insane asylum6'-- hardly the
serene rural setting advocated by sanatorium experts. Accommoda-
tions varied from facility to facility; some were deliberately
rough and primitive tents or "lean-tos" which provided minimal
shelter from the elements."
Even if physical environments were aesthetically pleasant,
sanatoria were seldom pleasant places in which to live. At the
simplest level, patients were bored -- sometimes physicians forbade
even reading, and there was little in the way of organized
entertainment or activities to help.'l Patients missed and
worried about their families. When women and children residing in
a preventorium72 near a New York City sanatorium were allowed to
letters written by patients and their families, of Dr. Lawrence
Flick, an early tuberculosis physician in Philadelphia who
established a sanatorium and a research hospital.
6g11Tuberculosis  Camp in Chicago,l'  Charities 16 (September 22,
1906): 609.
7'Klebs,  pp. 131 -'5.
'%Tohn  A. Hornsby, "A Need in Tuberculosis Hospitals," The
Modern Hospital 3 (November 1914): 315 - 7.
72Preventoria  were camp-like residential facilities in which
people thought to be at risk for developing tuberculosis could be
made healthy by a regimen of good food, rest and fresh air. They
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. ,visit their husbands/fathers, a physician noted ll...the beneflclal
influence . . . [on] the patient when he . . . can see for himself that
.his family, though deprived of his care, are [sic.] not in
want.1173 Some consumptives found the socio-economic and ethnic
mix in large institutions a shock.74 This must have been a
problem for many immigrants who came from mono-lingual ghettos in
large cities. Finally, and most difficult to bear, the care
providers were often rude. The physician in charge of a large
institution for the poor admitted apologetically:
I have occasionally had to reprove an . . . interne
because he seemed to forget that his hospit;idpa"f";;
was anything more than an interesting study;.
has sometimes seemed to me as though occaslonal,ly  [a]
. . . social worker looked on the same class of patient as
a sociological curiosity, rather than as a human be-
ing.75
Florence Burgess, nurse in charge of Connecticut's Gaylord
Sanatorium from 1904 until her death in 1935,  offers a good example
of the mind-set that professionals often brought to their work.
were especially promoted as places to which poor inner city
children could escape in the summer -- the forerunners of today's
"fresh  air camps.1V
73S. A. Knopf, '*The Modern Warfare Against Tuberculosis as a
Disease of the Masses," New York Medical Journal 100 (October 3;
1914): 655.
74Arthur K. Stone, "Some Problems of the Trustees of Massachu-
setts Hospitals for Consumptivesll' Boston Medical and Sursical
Journal 175 (October 12, 1916): 533. There were private sanatoria
run by religious organizations for their own communicants, of
course; Strunsky describes a political/religious institution run by
and for "radical  Jews."
75Walter Sands Mills, "Tuberculosis Infirmary of the Metropol-
itan Hospital" Charities and the Commons 21 (March 27, 1909), p.
1262.
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She thought it her responsibility to provide the atmosphere of
"refinement and culture" her patients needed to get well. She
suggested nature studies (bringing a flower to each bed patient),
recommended that nurses read "good literature" aloud to their
patients, and advocated decorated china and tray cloths so the food
would be attractively presented. It was the task of the nurse to
see that the sanatorium experience be a civilizing influence.
"There is no reason why sanatoriums should resemble prisons . . . .
[each patient] should return home with a knowledge of the essen-
tials of a true home life.@176.
At least Miss Burgess attempted to make patients' time in the
sanatorium interesting and pleasant. That her efforts were not
I
practiced in most sanatoria is evident from an angry indictment of
public institutions by Samuel Wolman, a dispensary physician.
Their well-known shortcomings included poor food served in an
unappetizing manner on a weekly schedule of "nauseating monotony."
Worse, insufficient staff resulted in reliance upon forced patient
labor (disguised as therapeutic exercise) for sanatorium mainte-
nance.77 Wolman was furious that his patients were often admitted
to sanatoria which were actively harmful. .
76Florence R. Burgess,
1908 Volume III, p. 519.
"Sanatorium Atmosphere," Sixth Consress
77Samuel Wolman, mA Criticism of Tuberculosis
Survev 39 (November 17, 1917): 165 - 8.
Sanatoria,"
institution of "therapeutic exercise,"
On the benefits to the
ed Labor in Pulmonary Tuberculosis,
seeM.S. Paterson, "Graduat-
part II p. 894; A.H. Garvin,
It Sixth Congress 1908 Volume I
ment,"
"Improved Organization and Manage-
1909),
Fifth Meeting NASPTB (Philadelphia:
pp. 142-7. Bryder,
William F. Fell Co.,
Below the Magic Mountain, pp. 54 - 67
discusses the practice in Britain, where it originated.
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Wolman's  charges were substantially accurate. The fear of
tuberculosis was so great and the rewards for working with
consumptives so few that some nurses refused to care fortuberculo-
sis patients, in or out of sanatoria. 78 If conditions in sanato-
ria were unpleasant for patients, they were equally so for staff,
which in this period was almost always required to be residen-
tia1.7g Nurses often had to double as housekeepers, a practice
against which they protested, but finding sufficient reliable low
level workers was difficult.80 Officials sometimes were unable
to recruitevenmedicaldirectors; phy sicians dislikedworkingwith
advanced patients because it was '*uninteresting." Outcome
statistics were better in institutions which admitted only
81incipient cases, and the work was more rewarding and easier.
A nurse suggested that advanced patients needed the same.kind of
attention lepers did, for the same reason: "Our lepers are nursed
and cared for, not altogether out of sympathy, but because they
constitute a menace to the community. 1182 With attitudes such as
78Stella Fewsmith  and Louise Croft Boyd, "The Nurse and the
Tuberculosis Patient, 'I Sixth Congress 1908 Volume III p. 520.
7gHornsby,  p. 316.
800tto R. Eichel, **County Tuberculosis Hospital Problems,"
Thirteenth Meetina NASPTB (New York: J.J. Little and Ives Co.,
1917),  p. 457.
81George J. Nelbach, l'Some  Problems of County Tuberculosis
Hospitals, *' Thirteenth Meeting  NASPTB (New York: J.J. Little and
Ives Co., 1917),  p. 454.
82Harriet F'ulmer, **The Importance of Nursing and Supervision of
Advanced Cases of Tuberculosisll@ Sixth Congress 1908 Volume III p.
548.
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that, it is not surprising that administrators had to turn to the
patients themselves for staffing.
The boundary between staff and patients in almshouses and
mental institutions had been fuzzy throughout the nineteenth
century. Part of the process of the development of general
hospitals,in  the twentieth century was the definition and mainte-
nance of the line between professionals and their patients.83
Medical directors wanted sanatoria to be perceived as more like
hospitals than almshouses or mental institutions; using patients
as staff did not fit the image they wished to project.
One solution to the problem was to turn patients into staff
by providing "training." This was made more palatable by the
difficulty ex-patients had in finding employment upon discharge --
those trained to be tuberculosis nurses at least had a chance.to
be self supporting. The prestigious Henry Phipps Institute in
Philadelphia offered a two-year training program as early as 1904.
The practice of using Warrested cases of tuberculosis as atten-
dants" was not new, the physician in charge noted. He listed other
advantages as well: It would give such ex-patient nurses's  mlonger
period of residence under good conditions." Patients would respond
better to nurses who were first-hand examples of the benefits of
adhering to the therapeutic regimen. It would cost the institution
less. There were not enough regular nurses with either the
training or the inclination to work in sanatoria. Nurses trained
83Paul  Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine
(New York: Basic Books, 1982),  p. 159.
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at Phipps would not compete with l'regularq'  nurses, since they would
be prepared only for the nursing of tuberculosis. Of the nineteen
nurses who had been graduated from the program, he reported,
seventeen were employed, one was dead and one was ill -- encourag-
ing statistics.84
The lack of nurses persisted, and nurse-training programs were
offered in many sanatoria. A 1922 discussion about how to secure
the "best type" of nurse revealed that for the most part, general
hospitals did not train nurses for work with tuberculosis patients.
Speakers unanimously approved nurse-training by sanatoria andnoted
that such programs were popular despite "all the disadvantages of
dealing with patients, the limited field, and the difficulties as
to the class of certificate which could be offered to girls taking
this training....t185
The point about the "class of certificate" indicates that the
women trained in sanatoria as tuberculosis nurses were probably
able to find jobs onlv in such institutions. In effect, sanatoria
with training programs had a captive labor force which must have
84Charles J. Hatfield "Training for Professional Nursing in
Institutions for Tuberculos)is  Patients, )I Sixth Congress 1908 Volume
III pp. 407 - 11. See also Bates, chapter 11.
851tInformal  Discussion of Problems of Tuberculosis Sanatorium.
Administration,11 Transactions of the Eighteenth Annual Meetins  of
the National Tuberculosis Association (New York: NTA, 1922),  p.
729.
Other levels of personnel were trained at sanatoria as well.
There was a six-month training program at Gaylord to train ex-
patients as attendants because of the lack of nurses. See David
Lyman  I "The Work of the State Tuberculosis Commission, Its
Development and Present Outlook,11 Proceedinqs  of the Connecticut
State Medical Societv  (New Haven: CT State Medical Society, 1915),
pp. 203 - 3.
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had very little bargaining power. Some fortunate ex-patients who
had been trained as nurses were able to open boarding houses for
consumptives who were unwilling or unable to be admitted to
sanatoria. 86 Such opportunities were limited, however, to those
with capital to invest. Most sanatorium-trained nurses were
.unable to move about in search of better yobs and had to accept
whatever pay and working conditions they were offered..
OUTCOMES
Demographers do not know why the tuberculosis mortality rate
fell steadily throughout the .late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. General improvements in sanitation and public health,
coupled with increasing prosperity and the resulting improvements
in diet and housing account for some of the general improvement in
.. .
health in those years. Specific anti-tuberculosis interventions,
however, cannot be linked to downward mortality curves. 87
86Bates discusses options for TB nurses throughout her book,
especially in Chapter 11. Gallos describes the great diversity of
non-hospital enterprises in a resort town with a nearby sanatorium.. in servingHe indicates that some boarding houses specialized
specific ethnic groups or disease stages.
87Gretchen  Condran, Henry Williams and Rose Cheney, "The
Decline in Mortality in Philadelphia  from 1870 to.1930: The Role.of Municipal Services," in Sickness and Health , in America, eds.
Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald L. Numbers (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1985),  p. 427. One modern historian insists
that public health measures to isolate people with the disease were
responsible for the decrease in mortality., See Leonard G. Wilson,
The Role of"The Rise and Fall of Tuberculosis in Minnesota:
Infection, " Bulletin of the Historv of Medicine 66 (Spring 1992):
16 - 52. He may be right for as far as his case, of a scattered,
rural population in Minnesota goes, but I doubt his arguments can
be generalized to large urban areas.
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Did institutionalization work, if only because patients were
placed in environments in which their bodies could heal themselves?
Politicians, physicians and patients allaskedthis question in the
first decades of the sanatorium movement. Sanatorium administra-
tors produced statistics to prove that institutionalization did
work, but the numbers they published are very difficult for modern
researchers to interpret. Criteria for categories of disease
severity on admission and discharge, a common way of measuring the
success of treatment, were ill-defined. There were no controls.
Many institutions did not even bother to keep statistics. The
American Sanatorium Association attempted a coordinated follow-up
study in 1922. Of seven hundred sanatoria, only 43 sent usable
data; of those only 20 could track more than 50 percent of
discharged patients. One of the researchers understandably
wondered if the study should be continued since so few sanatoria
could afford the clerical help necessary to do follow-ups on pa-
tients.** Thus, statistics in the few published papers which
will be cited below should be read as tentative. They were
probably intended to be as much propaganda as scientific reporting.
The first thing one notices in seeking outcome data is that '
very little was published; only six such studies could be found in
the period reviewed. Further, sanatorium officials based their
calculations of results on the number of patients discharged alive.
**J. S. Whitney, "Report of the Sanatorium Follow-Up Study of
the National Tuberculosis Association,l' Transactions of the
Eiahteenth Annual Meeting of the National Tuberculosis Association
(New York: NTA, 1922),  pp. 720 - 1.
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Most did not mention mortality within the institution; in a rare
exception, Metropolitan Hospital's tuberculosis infirmary, where
the patients were "of the poorest, financially and physically,"
. .reported that 30 percent died, half of them within a month of
admission. 89 At the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's
. .
sanatorium for its (middle class) employees, 6.4 percent dledwhlle
institutionalized, "a figure which seems consistent with others.
A 6.3 percent death rate was reported for Loomis, another private
facility,g1 and 5 percent for the Massachusetts state system. 92
All the statistical reports of sanatoria  other than Metropolitan
Hospital, however, did not count patients who stayed less than
thirty days, which leaves us without information about deaths
occurring soon after admission.
Death was not the only reason for people to drop out of
sanatoria within the first month. Although the data is scanty, it
seems that substantial numbers of patients discharged themselves
for a variety of reasons. The physician who ran an 800 bed city
infirmary for advanced diseases commented,
8gMills,  pp. 1262 - 3.
"Horace J. Howk, Louis Dublin and Inger Knudsen, "The After-
History of Nine Hundred and Fifty-Three Tuberculosis Patients
Discharged from the Metropolitan Life Sanatorium from lzf'4t;z
.1920," Transactions of the Eighteenth Annual Meetina
National Tuberculosis Association (New York: NTA, 1922),  p. 274.
"Herbert Maxon  King, *'A Preliminary Study of the Value of
Sanatorium Treatment," Eishth Meetins  NASPTB (Philadelphia:
William Fell Co., 1912),  p. 86. He gives the number, 63 of 995.
I calculated the percentage.
g2Gertrude L. Farmer, "Is Sanatorium Treatment Worth While?"
Boston Medical and Sursical Journal 170 (March 19, 1914): 414.
. 
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I was asked . . . what became of the 10,589 patients
discharged  [in the seven years the infirmary  had been
open]. A few were cured. The vast majority  left at
their  own request; some because they felt well enough  to
return  to work, some to go to other institutions,  some
to indulge in their pet dissipationsbasome  because  they
were  homesick  and wished  to go home.
Another  author summarized  reasons that fifty patients  gave for
leaving Massachusetts state sanatoria. "Dissatisfied with
sanatorium,"  *lobjectedtotreatment,V1  "homesick,"  "home or business
conditions,"  l'discouragedll and fVmisconductll account  for half of
them.g4 It is fair to conclude  that sanatoria  were  not popular
places.
When  reporting  upon outcomes of patients  who completed
treatment, sanatoria  administrators  revealed  a preoccupation with
labelling  the stage of disease, probably  due a desire  to demon-
strate  that patients  could improve. Upon admission,  the disease
status  of each patient  was classified  as "incipient,V'  "moderately
advanced,"  nadvanced." "Stage I, II, III"  and 'learlyWV and "late"
were  other terms used. When discharged, the patient's  condition
was relabeled  as "apparently  cured," "arrested,"  llimproved,**
"unimproved." Criteria  by which labels were applied  were  not
provided, and the labels themselves  varied  from institution  to
g3Mills,  p. 1263.
g4 Farmer, p. 414. Other reasons given are "insufficient
evidence  of tuberculosis,"  "too far advanced,"  “pregnant, I1 "lack of
funds," 'Vneurasthenic,11  "came for education, " "to follow  treatment
at home." Many gave no reason at all.
Figure 1: Outcome Statistics as Presented in 1912.
One of seven pages of tables in Herbert Maxon  King, "A
Preliminary Study of the Value of Sanatorium Treatment," Eishth
Annual Meetins  of the National Association for the Studv and
Prevention of Tuberculosis (Philadelphia: William Fell Co., 1912),
p. 94.
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institution and over time.g5 Data was presented by classifica-
tion in lengthy and complex tables, an example of which is
reproduced in Figure 1, opposite. This is one of seven pages of
tables, each of which requires two additional pages of text to
explain it!-g6 Numbers such as these are meaningless even as
measures of the predictive power of the initial categories.
Given the desire to prove the success of their facilities,
especially if success was defined as improvement rather than cure,
it is surprising that none of the sanatorium directors providing
outcomes correlated condition at discharge with length of stay in
the institution. In fact, few mentioned length, of stay at all.
Those that did indicated that around six months was the aver-
age.g7 "Bottom line" statistics -- reported survival rates
-- varied widely but do not support the notion that sanatoria were
successful in achieving cures, though there are no comparative
g5Edward R. Baldwin, "Annual Report of the Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Board of Trustees of the Trudeau
Sanatorium,1*  Thritv-Third Annual Report of the Trudeau Sanatorium
(Saranca Lake NY, November 1917),  p. 6.
'%ing, p. 91.
g7Farmer gives a range of 5.25 to 6.50 months and comments
that this is too short [Farmer, p. 4151. Billings and Hawes, also
of the Massachusetts state system, say their subjects stayed an
average of slightly over 6 months. [Bernice W. Billings and John B.
Hawes, 'IAre Sanatoria Worthwhile ?'I Thirteenth Annual Meetins  of the
NASPTB (New York: J.J. Little & Ives Co., 1917), p. 2051
Baldwin's Trudeau Sanatorium patients stayed an average of five
months and eighteen days in 1917, which, he comments, was shorter
than in the past. [E. Baldwin, p. 7.1 At the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. sanatorium for employees, stays ranged between 7 and
14 months and averaged almost 10 months.
kept until completely well,
Patients were evidently
as the author comments that the
interval between discharge and resuming work was usually around a
week. [Howk et. al., pp. 272-3.)
t
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rates available for matched nonyinstitutionalized  patients. The
only studies published between 1908 and 1919 which gave' such
figures indicate that survival rates varied between a low of 18%
over 20 years and a high of 68% after six years.g8 By present
standards these studies are flawed because they do not follow each
cohort of patients separately, but lump together those recently
discharged with those out for many years. The fall-off after
discharge may have been rapid: Results of the only study which
followed the same cohort of people found that forty-five percent
were dead within two years." Statistics such as these would not
be considered an advertisement for the efficacy of therapy-today,
but we have no way of knowing how they were received by either
patients or physicians in their time. Such data raise more
questions than they answer.
Although the numbers we have are not useful for statistical
calculations, they. are important because they. contradict the
prescriptive literature about patient selection. No matter what
their official admission policies were, all institutions, public
and private, which
in all categories
provided numerical outcomes reported patients
of severity; most had more "advancedfl  than
g8See  : Lawrason Brown, "The  Ultimate Results of Sanatorium
Treatment," Transactions of Sixth International Conaress, 1908
Vol I Part II p. 937 - 8; Edwin Locke and Cleaveland Floyd, "An
Economic Study of 500 Consumptives Treated in the Boston Consump-
tives" Hospital", Seventh Meetins  NASPTB (Philadelphia: William
Fell Co., 1911),  p. 149; Fred H. Heise, "The  Condition of patients
Twenty Years After Discharge from the Trudeau Sanatorium,tI  American
Review of Tuberculosis 3 (October 1919): 499; King, p. 87; Farmer,
PO 414; Billings and Hawes, p. 204.
"Billings and Hawes, pp. 204-5.
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"incipient"  cases. IntheMassachusetts  state sanatoria which were
said to be for "incipient"  patients only, between 1906 and 1912
only 36 percent of admissions were categorized "incipient. 'I 100
Even private facilities are shown to have been unable to restrict
admissions to the early stages; of the patients discharged alive
between 1902 and 1911 from Loomis, a mere fourteen percent had been
admitted as nincipient.**lO1  In 1913, the superintendent of an
Iowa state sanatorium which was supposed to be limited to early
cases complained that only nineteen percent of live discharges had
been admitted in the *'incipient"  category. In what was probably
common practice, instead of limiting admissions, he had "kept the
institution as full as [he] could...."io2 Thus, it appears that
sanatoria were in fact places for patients with late disease
despite their supposedly greater effectiveness in treating people
in the earlier stages.
CONCLUSION
The tuberculosis sanatorium as a place for custodial care. of
the chronically ill did not fit the acute care hospital model which
was emerging in the first decade of the century. Since status
among physicians was increasingly associated with hospital
affiliation, those staffing sanatoria tried to make their institu-
tions seem more like hospitals. This explains the attention
"'Farmer,  p. 414.
lolKing,  p. 87.
'02H. V. Scarborough, **Treatment of Tuberculosis at the Iowa
State Sanatorium, I1 The Modern Hospital 2 (June 1914): 382.
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physicians wanted to pay to people in the early stages of the
.disease, when treatment was presumed to be most effective and
people most in need of their skills. The terminally ill presented
no scientific challenges. It also accounts in part for the*
difficulty .of staffing sanatoria -- they lacked the prestige
increasingly enjoyed by general hospitals or medical schools where
clinical and technological research generated rapid change in
therapeutic approaches.
Like mental institutions, sanatoria "served a variety of
purposes, some of which were inadvertently thrust upon them by a
society seeking solutions to novel problems which grew, in part,
out of rapid social and economic change. w103 It is clear that
the problem for which sanatoria were posited as solutions was only
in part a medical problem. First, most consumptives could have
been equally ,well treated at home if the money spent on the
construction of sanatoria had been spent on better housing and
support services. Second, sanatoria didn't cure many people.
Third, enough people never could have been isolated in sanatoria
to stop the spread from person to person -- it would have been
impossible to have had enough beds to institutionalize every
indigent consumptive until death or cure occurred. 104
The true problem of the sick poor in cities, then as now, was
only in part medical. We know that tuberculosis declined because
:
.I
_‘ ’
_’ ‘: (
lo31bid.,  p. 141.
.
lo41n England, for example, only ?% ofThyTe;;u;vyf  ;;;eF~;y
admitted to sanatoria in 1911. F.B. Smith,
. losis 1850 - 1950 (London: Croom Helm, 1988),  p. 130.
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standards of living rose -- the problem of the sick poor is also
. .
a problem of housing, employment, general sanitation, and nutri-
tion. It is complex and resistant to simple solutions. By
spending inordinate amounts of time staging the disease of each
patient before, during and after admission, and then devising rules
.
and regulations for how patients should eat and rest, physicians
convinced themselves that they  were curing tuberculosis. Similar-
ly, by spending large amounts of money on facilities to which the
.
more bothersome and frightening patients  could be sent, me&Cal
professionals, philanthropists and tax-payers deluded themselves
into thinking thattheytreatingthe  disease effectively. All this
probably did make some people more comfortable, and may even have
cured some. More than anything, however, sanatoria, merely by
their existence, reduced anxiety and made everyone (including,
probably, the patients in them) feel that something was being done,
that the situation was (or soon would be) under control.
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CHAPTER II
HARTFORD AND ITS POOR AND SICK
This chapter introduces Hartford between 1900 and 1910 and
discusses how the needs of its sick poor were met. After a general
description of the city, the focus narrows, first to a consider-
ation of philanthropic and public provision for the poor, ' then
L to support available at the almshouse and finally to medical care
available at the City Hospital and Hartford Hospital. Discussion
of the treatment of tuberculosis occurs in Chapter III.
Hartford was a diverse, growing city in the, first decade of
the twentieth century. Although there was migration from other
parts of the United States, newcomers from abroad accounted for
much of the population increase -- between 1900 and 1910, the city
as a whole grew 24% while the foreign born increased 40%. A
growing number of the new inhabitants looked and sounded different
from other immigrant groups. Canadians, English, Irish and
Scottish continued to arrive at a steady rate, but the number of
non-English speaking people (Austrians, Poles, Rumanians, Hungari-
ans, Russians, Italians and Greeks) almost trebled in the decade.2
'1 have used llpoor I1 broadly throughout this paper; it should
be understood to include the working poor as well as the utterly
destitute, because a chronic debilitating disease such as tubercu-
losis could impoverish even skilled artisans and lower white collar
workers. This was a not inconsiderable part of the terror of the
disease.
2 Information extrapolated from Ellsworth Grant and Marion H.
Grant, The City of Hartford, 1784 - 1984 (Hartford: Connecticut
Historical Society, 1986), tables on .page 178. Numbers from
I countries listed grew by 280 per cent over the decade.
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Immigrants were attracted by the employment available in a
large number of industrial and service enterprises. The census
counted 888 manufacturers in Hartford in 1900; the city directory
for that year lists 23 hotels, 62 restaurants, and numerous white
collar employers such as insurance companies, law offices and state
bureaus.3
As early as the 187Os, when the state capital was moved from
New Haven, Hartford's downtown section had begun to experience a
modest boom in construction of handsome office and business
buildings, some with residential quarters on upper floors. This
continued into the new years of the twentieth century,4  and the
city fathers were proud of the modernity surrounding them.
Hartford was the first city in New England to be lit entirely by
electric lights; sewers and water mains had been laid under the
streets, the majority of which were paved; most buildings fronting
them were of brick or stone. Trolleys or "street railroads,"
already present downtown, pushed deeper into the suburbs as the
decade passed.5 There were also a growing number of places of
3Abstract  of the Twelfth Census of the United States (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office, 1902),  table 175, p. 368. Geers
Hartford Citv Directorv, (Hartford: Hartford Printing Co., 1900),
PP. 705 b, u, v. [hereafter noted as Hartford City Directory,
19xX]. The Hartford Citv Directory, 1901 lists 123 attorneys (p.
756 - 7).
4Gregory  E. Andrews and David Ransom, Structures and Styles:
Guided Tours of Hartford Architecture (Hartford: Connecticut
Historical Society and The Connecticut Architecture Foundation,
1988), pp. 2 - 39.
5The electric lights were turned on June 23, 1890. Hartford
Citv Directory, 1900 p. 706f. The Hartford City Directory, 1897
was the last to code streets to indicate the presence of electric
I
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bucolic beauty -- by 1895 five major parks had been added to the
forty year old Bushnell Park to create a green ring around the
city.6
Despite such amenities, Hartford was an old city, and rapid
population growth had not been accompanied by a commensurate
increase in such fundamentals as decent housing  in the parts of the
city in which the poor congregated. As each wave of successful
immigrants moved along trolley lines to ethnically defined
neighborhoods to the north, south and west, some remained behind
in the increasingly overcrowded east side which had been their
first stop.7 Misery and disease flourished in an environment of
overcrowded tenements and poverty.8
lighting, gas pipes, sewers and water mains; it indicates they were
present for all streets in the center of the city. See also
Hartford Board of Trade, Hartford, Connecticut (Hartford: Board of
Trade, 1889) p. 152. The Atlas of the City of Hartford CT
(Springfield MA: L.J. Richards & Co., 1896 and 1909) indicates
building materials, presence of sewers, trolley lines, etc.
6Pope Park, Keney Park, Riverside park, Goodwin Park, Colt
Park. Elizabeth Park in West Hartford, also acquired at this time,
was on a trolley line and easily accessible to Hartford people.
John Alexopoulos, The Nineteenth Century  Parks of Hartford: A
Lesacv to the Nation (Hartford: Hartford Architecture Conservancy,
1983),  pp. 23 - 28.
7Robert Pawlowski, How The Other Half Lived (West Hartford:
N.W. Catholic Hiah School, 1973); telephone interview with Michael
Persk i Architecture Conservancy by author, January
30, I!
I !ments were among the worst in the United
States, -Aa- b no laws controlling conditions in them other. . -- -
than general requirements for light and ventilation. See Robert
i.
DeForest  and Lawrence Veiller, eds The Tenement House Problem (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1903),  pp. 57, 155..,'
1’ J
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THE POOR: PUBLIC SUPPORT AND PRIVATE PRILWOPY
The city fathers felt some responsibility for the poor and had
operated a residential facility first called a "town farm" and
later an "almshouse" for the destitute homeless as early as 1811.'
"Families with infant children whom it is desirable to keep
together under the care of their parents"  could receive "outdoor
relief"l' in the form of food, fuel and financial assistance for
rent and transportation costs from the "keeper of the storeroom"
at the almshouse.ll
Compassionate citizens realized that such aid was often both
too little and too late, and a variety of organizations formed by
Hartford's privileged had arisen by the 1890s. There were
benevolent, religious and philanthropic groups interested in causes
as varied as housing for single women, clean streets, parks and
playgrounds, recreational programs for children, literacy (primari-
ly for immigrants), training programs for employment for the poor
(usually "housekeepinglq courses for immigrantwomento prepare them
for domestic service) and many others. Members of some associa-
tions watched over the functioning of city departments and sat on
'Charles W. Burpee, History  of Hartford County  Connecticut
(Hartford: S.J. Clarke Publishing Co., 1928),  Vol I, p. 244.
"Board of Charitv .Commissioners Annual RenortL  (Hartford:
Ward Printing Co., 1897),  p. 6. This enabled families to remain
togther. If parents were homeless, their dependent children were
sent to the city orphanage.
"For a discussion of goods and services supplied see, fz;
example, "Charity Department, I1 Municipal Resister of The Citv
Hartford (Hartford: Case, Lockwood, Brainard and Co., 1904), pp.
447 - 8
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the boards of Parks, Police, Street and Charity Commissions.
Hartford's comfortable and affluent families were well represented
on the rosters of such clubs and organizations. 12
Well meaning as members of these associations were, there was
inconsistency and overlap both within and among the groups. By
1890 the situation had become so chaotic that representatives of
charitable agencies formed an umbrella organization, the Charity
Organization Society.13 After an investigation sponsored by the
society, in 1896 public charity was placed in the hands of the
members of a Board of Charity Commissioners, 14 who were to
12See  Barbara Donahue, Civic Club of Hartford (Hartford:
Trinity College MA thesis, 1992),  and Janet T. Murphy, The Union
for Home Work: A Study of 19th Century Female Benevolent Societies
(Hartford: Trinity College MA Thesis, 1988) for discussions of
many of these organizations. The Donahue paper provides an
extensive discussion of tenement reform cooperatively carried  out
by a number of benevolent societies. City Directories of the
period offer listings of ,many clubs and associations whose titles
suggest civic involvement. The following partial list is taken
from the Hartford Citv Directory, 1901 (pp. 894 - 896): Charitable
Society, Church Home, Civic Club, Friendly Visitors, Hartford
Branch of the Children's Aid Society, Hebrew Benevolent Associa-
tion, Larabee Fund [for the relief of "lame,  maimed and deformed
females"], Motherhood Club, Open Hearth [then as now, a shelter]
Shelter for Women [later the YWCA], Union for Home Work, Widows
Society, Womens Aid Society, YMCA. The Hartford City Directory,
1910 retains all these and adds a few: Consumptives Aid Society,
German Aid Society, Hartford Settlement, Visiting Nurse Associa-
tion.
13The  Charity Organization Society movement was national fn
scope; what occurred in Hartford was typical of such efforts in
many other cities. See Kenneth L. Kusmer, "The Functions of
Organized Charity in the Progressive Era: Chicago as a Case Study"
Journal of American History 40 (December 1973): 657-78.
14There were 6 commissioners, each of whom served a three year
term. Two rotated on and two off each year. I have been unable to
discover who appointed them -- perhaps they formed a self-sustain-
ing board. Most served only one term, but 9 of the 22 men
appointed between 1896 and 1910 stayed on -- six for two terms and
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administer the almshouse and oversee the expenditure of all city.
funds paid to or expended for the poor. This change brought order
and accountabilitytothe city's disbursements and planning process
for the almshouse and outdoor relief. Annual reports began to
appear in 1897 which documented money spent, people served, staff
activities and building repair and renovation. 15
The Charity Organization Society intended that the private
sector should function in an orderly manner as well. Voluntary
organizations were to cooperate in their almsgiving by maintaining
central records so that information could be shared and by allowing
the Society to conduct "investigations u of petitioners to be sure
they were qualified to receive aid.16 The agencies in question,
however, did not always wish to be organized. They were jealous
three for three terms. See Board of Charity Commissioners Annual
Reoorts, 1897 - 1911.
15These reports are remarkably detailed, and deserve close
attention. They discuss building plans and renovations and give
financial breakdowns of monies expended on safaries, admlnlstra-. .
tion, and food or supplies distributed to reclplents  both wlthln
outside the almshouse. Those "out door poor'*  who received $12 or
more in aid in the year were listed by name and amount spent on
them; those buried by the city were also named. Statistical
breakdowns were made by nativity, occupation and age of almshouse
inmates, and they too were named . People who had died at the
almshouse or at the hospitals were recorded. For each hospital,
patients whose care had cost the taxpayers more than $12 in the
year were enumerated along with the dollar amounts spent for-each.
The insane were named and statistically summarized in a slmllar
manner. Orphan children were not identified but disposition of
children to the various orphanages was summarized.
16Donahue, pp. 7 - 15 discusses this and lists some of the
many benevolent clubs and societies involved. For an extended
discussion of one of the first and most important of these, see the
Murphy paper.
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of their independence and reluctant to relinquish any control over
their particular clients.
In 1901, the executive director of the COS found it necessary
to reassure members that no '@interference" in their operations was
intended, that "centralized management" was not a goal, and that
.all that was sought was co-operation so that agencies did not
"frustrate" each other's p1ans.l'  Despite hesitations about the
propriety of sharing information or having potential recipients
investigated, most agencies participated in the program proposed
by COS. The needy also seem to have recognized the effectiveness
of the Society's clearing-house activities and began to apply
directly to it for help. In 1901there were 1,652 direct applica-
tions compared with 1,370 through provider agencies; by 1910 the
figures were 3,773 and 1,871 respectively.l*
I
The magnitude of the problem of poverty in Hartford is
suggested by the fact that the Charity Organization Society
maintained files on.5,919  families in 19Ol.l' This statistic is
I'Charitv Organization Society Annual Report, 1901 (Hartford:
W. H. Barnard, 1901),  pp. 5 - 6. I could locate only annual
reports for 1901, 1908 and 1910.
181901  figures from Charity Organization Societv  Annual
Report, 1901, pp. 6, 8; those for 1910 from COS Annual Report,
1910, p. 6.
I'COS  Annual Report, 1901, p. 7. Incredibly, this could
represent as many as 25,000 individuals -- and the population of
Hartford at this time was around 100,000. Almshouse outdoor relief
statistics for 1904 indicate that the 133 families receiving aid
consisted of 623 persons. ["Charity Department," Municipal
Resister, Citv of Hartford 1904, p. 4461 My calculations indicate
that this is an average of 4.7 individuals per family; if the COS
families were as large, it works out to 27,819 people. Perhaps
families in the COS files were much smaller, or the city's
nineteenth century, and by 1900 there were two hospitals, Hartford
Hospital (1854) and St. Francis Hospital (1897), a "Dispensary"
or out-patient clinic, three homes for the aged/widowed, three
orphanages, a home/school for the blind and another for the deaf,
20a "retreat" for the insane, and an almshouse. Virtually all
i
provision of outdoor relief selected large families over individu-
als -- the presence of dependent children may have predisposed
officials to grant aid more readily. It is also possible that the
COS retained records of families to whom assistance had been
denied, thus artificially increasing the number. On the other
hand, the mere application for help indicates a felt need on the
part of the suppliant. In any case, the COS figure may be taken as
an indication that the needy population was in fact quite large.
20Hartford  City Directory, 1900. See also: Burpee, Volume II
PP. 691 - 4; William F. Henney, "Modern Factors in Municipal
Progress 'I Connecticut Maqazine 9 (1905): 825 - 7, 836 - 7; Robert
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from the early period, when agencies were reluctant to share
information about applicants, and thus may be an under-representa-
tion of the extent of need in the city. It is no surprise that
even to begin to meet such a high level of distress required the
efforts of.the city government and a number of private charitable
agencies as well. Although many recipients of charitable assis-
tance were probably experiencing temporary difficulty and passed
through their hard times relatively quickly, some were dependent
for years or even lifetimes. The problems presented by the sick,
disabled, elderly, orphaned and homeless required more permanent
(and costly) solutions. Throughout the nineteenth century a number
of institutions for those purposes had been established in the
city.
Residential institutions had begun to appear  early  in the
.
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these had been founded by and were operated with money donated by
the citizens of the city. Municipal and state funds sometimes
subsidized care or maintenance of the inmates, but only the
almshouse and one orphanage in the above list were directly
financed.by  the city's taxpayers.
TEE POOR: TEE ALMSHOUSE
\
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the city
constructed a new almshouse on Holcombe Street, on the north edge
of town, to provide a place for the indigent homeless. 21 The
average daily census of this facility in 1900 was 226 people. 22
Accommodations consisted of large dormitories with separate
' facilities for men, women and children; there were flush toilets,
and hot water ran to the porcelain bath tubs and the showers.23
A. Woods and Albert J. Kennedy, eds Handbook of Settlements (New
York: Arno Press, 1970) (reprint of 1911 edition) pp. 27 - 8.
21Burpee,  Volume I p. 244. I
22Renort of the Board of Charitv Commissioners, 1900 p. 6. On
the day the census was taken, June 2, the enumerator found 92 men,
76 women and eight children in residence at the Almshouse. We can
assume this to be one of the lowest populations of the year, since
those able to work at seasonal agricultural jobs would have left.
1900 Manuscript Census, reel 137, enumeration district 539, sheets
1A - 2B.
23Renort of the Board of Charitv Commissioners, 1898, p. 11 -
12 and 1899, p. 6. The commission replaced separate rooms with
dormitories in these years, and they were large indeed. The 1898
report describes a male dormitory of 102 x 32 feet to hold 55 beds;
the female dormitory was of similar size but no bed numbers were
specified. In 1899 a second male dormitory, 95 x 48 feet for 74
beds, was added. The children's dormitory (also described in 1899)
was 42 x 28 feet, but no number of beds is given. All dormitories
were called "light and airy," and the management felt they were a
"great improvement on the room system" because they promoted
"discipline and cleanlinessIt and (probably more importantly)
provided space for more beds. (1898, p. 12)
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Yet the almshouse was as much a jail as a refuge for its inmates:
The Hartford Courantnoted in 1903 that they were swallowed  out once
a month for visiting," a decrease from the former practice of twice I
a month because they had "returned from the city in poor condi-
tion.w24
‘Idleness was not encouraged or tolerated in the almshouse.
Residents provided labor f,or routine maintenance as well as for
most new construction and renovations. Men chopped wood, painted,
dug a sewer line, built an ice house, and acted as masons and
carpenters. Women did the laundry and sewed dresses for themselves
and the children and shirts, overalls and *'jumpers*'  for the men.
Nevertheless, the Charity Commissioners noted in 1898 that they
.were "still wrestling with the problem" of "provid[ing]  systematic
and constant employment for all the inmates at all seasons of the
year suited to their conditions and capacities. 1125
THE SICK POOR: SOURCES OF CARE
When indigent people were ill, they could receive care at a
dispensary (and doubtless some physicians treated the poor either
for a reduced or no fee in their private offices) or consult a city
physician who practiced out of the almshouse. The city and the
hospitals themselves subsidized hospitalization when patients were
'IHartford  Courant January 3, 1900, p. 5.
25Quote from Charitv Commissioners Annual Report, 1898, 12.
Other information from the annual reports of this board in the
years 1898 and 1899 which contain most information about actual
living conditions of the inmates because the Board was. i,n the
process of reorganizing both the physical plant and the admlnistra-
tion of the almshouse. After 1900, little is said on the matter.
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destitute. Private charity groups do not seem to have been of much
help to people who had difficulty paying medical bills. The
Charity Organization Society's annual reports probably do not
summarize aid given by all philanthropic and religious sources, but
they offer the only information available about how private monies
were dispensed. Their tables show that non-public resources used
by the Society to help with medical and hospital costs came from
relatives, friends, churches and Sunday schools.26 Voluntary
agencies were more interested in the wider social aspects of
disease prevention and control (clean streets, parks, nutrition)
and were largely non-participants in the struggle with illness once
it had reached the stage where treatment was necessary.
Some physicians in Hartford tried to regularize and organize
their free care by establishing what would today be known as an
outpatient clinic. Their first effort to establish what they
called "The Hartford Dispensary, I1 was undertaken in 1871and failed
for want of patients, but their second attempt, in 1884, was
successful. Staffed by volunteer physicians recruited from among
members of the Hartford Medical Society, assisted by the "young
ladies of the Junior League [who] gave their services as atten-
dants, I1 the dispensary was on Prospect Street. It is difficult to
know whether this is the same "dispensary" at which the city
26Charitv Organization Society Annual Report, 1901, p. 14 -
15; 1910, p. 19. The table "What Was Done For The Applicants"
lists sources of relief by name and then the kinds of help obtained
after each source. "Board at hospital" or "medical treatment"
occur in lists including llcoal," "rent," "stove repairs" and the
like -- and for some funding sources there is no indication of how
the money was spent.
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physician called, or if there was also a dispensary at the
almshouse. The latter seems more likely, since those writing the
annual report for the Hartford Dispensary noted with pride that it
was a "purely  privateI'  charity, receiving no city funding. 27
The .almshouse  was a place to which people went both for
outpatient care and for examinations to determine whether they
qualified for city subsidized hospitalization elsewhere. Hiring
a medical doctor to work directly for the city appears to have been
part of the reorganization of public aid instituted by the Board
of Charity Commissioners, for mention of the position appears first
in 1898. The city physician resided at the almshouse, where he
also received board and a horse and carriage. 28 Although his
duties were not specified, they can be inferred from later annual
reports of the Board of Charity Commissioners, which always gave
statistical information about his work. In 1903, for example, the
report listed 678 house visits, 3,228 treatments performed at the
almshouse, 1,374 calls at the dispensary, 899 cases examined for
admission to the hospital (see below), 195 cases examined for
admission to the almshouse (of which 129 were approved), 82 cases
examined for insanity (52 admitted) for a total of 6,716 treatments
27Burpee,  Volume II, p. 691 - 2. The Hartford Dispensary
Annual Report, 1916 (no publication data listed), p. 3. This is
the only annual report for the Dispensary I have been able to
locate. In that year, 8806 patients were seen (p. 22).
28Board of Charitv Commissioners Annual Report  1898, p. 7.
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and examinations. Medicines were made available to the poor at the
almshouse.2g
Patients whose bills were to be paid by the city were  not
admitted to a hospital without approvalbythe city physician. This
was granted more often than not; in 1902 - 3, for example, 899
cases were examined for admission to the hospital and 652 (72%)
were approved.30 Until the city formally added medical units to
the almshouse in 1906, 40 - 45 percent of funds appropriated for
care of the city's poor were spent upon institutional care for the
.-
2gPlBoard of Charity Commissioners," Municipal Resister, Citv
of Hartford, 1903, p. 585, 599. This report gives the physician's
annual salary as $1,000.
30nCharity Commissioners Annual Report," Municipal Resister,
Citv of Hartford, 1903, p. 599. The city physician also examined
"cases of insanity" for referral to institutional care and the
approval rate was a bit lower -- 52 of 82 (63%). The approval rate
seems to have increased as the decade progressed -- in 1908:  the
city physician approved 85,9 of those he examined for hospital-
ization. (Report of Board of Charitv Commissioners, 1908 p. 13).
Whether this is because of better pre-screening with the result
that he was seeing only the really ill or whether it represents the
availability of more beds (the City Hospital was also in operation
by this time), is unclear.
31Costs  were carefully detailed, though sometimesT;;i  broken
into categories useful to the modern investigator. , money
spent for the "insane and imbecile" is not separated from that
expended for the physically ill. The 40 - 45% figure is derived
from "Charity Commissioners Annual Report",, Municipal Reqister,
Citv of Hartford, 1903, pp 584, 600 ($36,905.34 of appropriation of
$89,000 or 41%); "Charity Commissioners Annual Report," Municipal
Resister, Citv of Hartford, 1904, pp. 445, 463 ($39,142.94  of
appropriation of $91,000 or 43%). It decreased only marginally
when the almshouse included inpatient facilities -- see Annual
Report of the Board of Charitv Commissioners, 1908, p. 5
($39,207.61 of appropriation of $109,000 or 36%).
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The.almshouse  provided minimal inpatient care for residents
in the years before 1905, and after that date began to function as
a municipal hospital. As early as 1899 there was a ward for (male)
inmates with tuberculosis and another for the "detention of mild
cases of insanity." Over the next few years, space was rearranged
SO there were separate areas for sick men, women and children
(considerably smallerthanthe dormitories for sleeping), and least
four "strong rooms" "to be used for the confinement of violent
cases of insanity and for violation of rules'I. During this early
period there was no nursing or medical staff on site; nursing sick
fellow inmates was probably among the housekeeping chores assigned
to female residents.32
THE SICK POOR AND THE CITY HOSPITAL
In the first years of the new century, charity commissioners
became concerned about the increase in numbers of sick inmates,
especially since many of them had tuberculosis. As noted above,
male residents with tuberculosis had been assigned to beds separate
from the general dormitories since the end of the nineteenth
century, but the increasing number of female consumptives now
32Board of Charitv Commissioners Annual Report, 1899, p. 6;
1906, p. 5. Wards for men and children were already present in
1897 but one for women was not added until 1905. Before 1906, the
jobs of the matron and her staff were to oversee the residential
population. When nurses were added to the payroll, the head nurse
was paid $540, the matron $355, and regular nurses approximately
$273 per year. (Board of Charitv Commissioners Annual Report, 1906,
pp. 31- 34.) This suggests that the head nurse's position carried
more authority and responsibility. When the city hospital was an
established entity, nurse and matron worked in separate parts of
the building and had distinct functions.
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Figure 2: City Hospital and Almshouse
The first time it appeared as an illustration in the "Report
of the Charity Department," Municipal Resister, Citv of Hartford
(Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Brainard, 1913), facing page 729.
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became a worry.33 As will be related in detail in Chapter III,
Hartford Hospital had been the destination for consumptives
requiring hospitalization, but in 1903-04 it stopped admitting
tuberculosis patients. The hospital was experiencing financial
difficulties and requested that the city increase its payment for
the care of indigent patients (regardless of diagnosis) from $4.00
or $5.0034 per week to $8.00. After a long discussion, the
aldermen decided to pay the requested amount until they could find
another solution, and the solution they preferred was to add space
to the almshouse, call the new area the city hospital, and care for
the indigent sick there.35
Additions to the almshouse, including a ward for female
consumptives, were made in 1904-05, and 1905-06 was the first full
year of operation of the section of the almshouse now known as the
city hospital. [An image of the almshouse/hospital is reproduced
as figure 2, opposite.] City-subsidized admissions to other
hospitals began to decrease. In 1904-05, the city paid for the
33Burpee,  Vol II, p. 695.
34The  amount depends upon the source. It is given as $4.00 in
the discussion in the city's Common Council Board [Journal of
Common Council Board, 1903 - 04 (Hartford: City Printing Co.,
1903) p. 8331 and as $5.00 per week in the Hospital's data
[Hartford Hospital Annual Report, (Hartford: Case, Lockwood,
1904),  p. 13.1 It is not always clear in the hospital's materials
exactly which kind of patient fee is being discussed -- for
example, paying patients were charged $7.00 per week [ibid], the
state paid $6.00 per week for old soldiers and the. U.S. Customs
House paid $7.00 per week for sailors. [Hartford Hospital Executive
Committee Minutes, December 29, 1903, p. 6 - 7. In any event, it
is clear that the hospital charged the city considerably less than
other payment sources.
35Journal of the Common Council Board, 1903, pp. 833 - 843.
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care of 380 people at Hartford Hospital. In 1908, only 127 were
referred there.36
The new city hospital, however, was not popular among the
people of Hartford. The hospital wards of the almshouse contained
111 beds, but during the first year the average daily census was
only 56 patients.37 People did not want to be admitted to a
hospital connected to the almshouse even though the Charity
Commissioners had tried to keep the two as separate as possi-
ble.38
A year after the city hospital opened, Hartford Hospital had
recovered from its financial difficulties. It reopened its
tuberculosis facilities and decreased its charges to the city to
$7.00 per week per patient for those with tuberculosis or other
contagious diseases and $5.00 per week per patient for .a11
others.3g The Board of Charity Commissioners thought it best to
'Iget rid of all tubercular patients at the Almshouse, and they were
36Annual Report, Board of Charity Commissioners, 1905, p. 23 -
27; Annual Report, Board of Charity Commissioners, 1908,,p. 25.-
26. These reports list names of individuals for whom the city paid
$12.00 or more at the named hospital in the past year.. This is the
only source of information about hospital use by city-supported
patients; unfortunately for the researcher, there is no demographic
information given for the people listed except their names and the
dollar amount spent upon them.
37Journal of the Common Council Board, 1906-07, p. 1029.
38Their zeal to separate the two facilities, however, did not
extend to providing separate entrances for them. A second doorway
would have cost $300, and the committee "[did]  not consider such
action worthy of the expense." See Journal of the Common Council
Board, 1906 - 7, p. 1035.
3gHartford Hospital Executive Committee Minutes, March 21,
1907, p. 102.
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accordingly transferred to the Hartford Hospital Tubercular Annex
about September 1, 1905, and these wards [i.e. those now vacated
at the city hospital] were put in use for Hospital cases. n40
A controversy then arose among the city councilmen over
whether or not to keep the city hospital section of almshouse open.
It was difficult for the councilmen to compute daily cost per
patient at the city hospital because it was unclear which fixed
costs (heat, repairs, insurance, etc) should be charged to the
hospital and which to the almshouse. The committee reporting to
the Common Council Board thought it was probably about $5.00 per
week per patient excluding fixed expenses. Patients requiring
acute care or special treatments had to be sent to other hospitals;
the city hospital had no x-ray machine, could not accommodate
contagious or tubercular cases, and lacked facilities for special
problems such as eye cases. Nevertheless, a majority of an
investigating committee endorsed a report stating that on the whole
the economics of treating the indigent ill in a city hospital
attached to the almshouse were favorable.41
A considerable difficulty was presented by what the common
council delicately called nsentiment.ll The city hospital was not
a place to which people were willing to be admitted. A majority
of the committee reporting upon the problem insisted that no stigma
was or should be attached to admission to the city hospital. A. .
40Board of Charity Commissioners Annual Report, 1906, p. 5.
41Journal of the Common Council Board, 1906 - 07, pp.1028 -
1033.
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vocal minority felt that, not only had the costs been underes-
timated, but also there was great resistance among the people to
being admitted to a hospital located on the edge of the city in the
almshouse. This group wished to close the wards at the almshouse
except for care of its chronically ill inmates.42
Care of the poor of the city was a matter of heated discussion
among physicians as well. The minutes of the Hartford Medical
Society for February 5, 1906 note that a subcommittee had a "long
and stormy session and needed the assistance of the members [of the
l that as theysociety] on the question of the care of the town poor,
knew of no specific case whatever of any neglect or improper care
on the part of the town physician, they would like any one knowing
of any such instance to report same to the committee in de-
tai1.8t43
At the next meeting, the topic of which was "The Care and
Disposal of the Sick Poor of Hartford, I1 a physician complained that
the poor did not know how to call the town physician at 'Iodd
hours." The problem, he continued, was notwiththe town physician,
but with the policies of the Board of Charities, which, he thought,
npurposely  made it difficult [to contact the town physician] in
order to lessen the number of calls."
The ensuing discussion was as much about the finances of a
hospital at the almshouse as about the quality of care received by
the patients. Note was taken of how unwilling the poor were to be
42ibid.,  pp. 1033 - 41.
43Hartford  M e d i c a l  Society Minutes,  Vol.  19 (1go6-7), p. 16.
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treated in the almshouse hospital (with an example of a "boy with
appendicitis who begged not to be taken to the almshouse") and of
how the poor sometimes found friends to pay for them at St. Francis
or Hartford Hospitals but ended up being "thrown upon the charity
of the hospital." Several speakers disputed the cost estimates
made for the almshouse hospital, asserting that it would burden the
taxpayers less if the sick poor were treated at one of Hartford's
other hospitals at city expense. Eventually the members of the
society agreed that the "infirmary at the almshouse should be used
only for the care of the sick inmates of the almshouse, and for
such chronic cases as are permanent city charges." As one
remarked, there was "but half a hospital at the almshouse.@144
The city hospital, however, did not close. After a long
discussion, the City Councilmen reached a compromise whereby "any
sick person, temporarily unable to meet the expense of his care,
may choose the hospital to which he shall be sent, with the
understanding that he will repay the expense as soon as may be
after his recovery." The Charity Commissioners were to be "relied
on to make use of the [city hospital] in a manner worthy of the
City's reputation for kindliness and humanity.1*45 There is no
indication that this policy was ever implemented, 46 and the
44Hartford  Medical Society Minutes, Volume 19, pp. 25, 41-46,
48.
45nMayor'~ Message" Municipal Register. Citv of Hartford,
1907, pp. 10 - 11.
46The  hospital at the almshouse remained in a kind of institu-
tional limbo, staffed by the city physician, his assistant and a
handful of nurses, until the early 1920s. After a study by the
.:
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hospital at the almshouse gradually received more staff, although
the average daily census continued to hover between 50 and 60
throughout the period under discussion. By 1908 there was a head
nurse with ten nurses under her,47 and by 1910 the city physician
. .was also known as the "Surgeon in Chief”  and had been -joined by a
Visiting, Medical and Surgical Staff " consisting of four other
physicians and an intern.48
TEE SICK POOR AND HARTFORD HOSPITAL
Although St. Francis Hospital had become the second inpatient
facility in the city in 1897, Hartford Hospital remained the
primary source of care for indigent patients. St. Francis refused
tubercular,, syphilitic, "and a number of other cases . . . for the
very good reason that their nurses are sisters, and they don't
think they ought to compel those sisters, who work for nothing, to
Board of Charity Commissioners in 1921 a new system of rotating
physicians was adopted, and a coalition of some 62 doctors from St.
Francis and Hartford Hospitals staffed it. At some point between
then and the 196Os,  it was renamed McCook Hospital and the
almshouse building was replaced by a brick box. In the 195Os,  it
was absorbed by the University of Connecticut for its medical
school and moved out of the city to a new campus in Farmington  in
the 1960s. The original site on Holcombe Avenue is now city
administrative offices. Information about the 1921 reorganization
may be found in a folder, "Hartford Connecticut Municipal Hospital:
History of the Formation of the Rotating Staff" at the Hartford
Medical Society. The whereabouts of the records of the almshouse
and McCook Hospital is unknown.
47Board of Charity  Commissioners Annual Report, 1908, p. 33.
There was also a hospital steward. Costs for hospital and
almshouse, however, were not separated.
48Board of Charity Commissioners Annual Report, 1911, p. 3.
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take care of disgusting diseases.1f4g Such "disgusting diseases"
were especially likely to be the lot of the poor, so the locus of
their care continued to be Hartford Hospital. That institution's
operating expenses were met by a biannual state appropriation of
$10,000~0, .endowment, philanthropic giving, benefits given by
civic groups, and patient fees.51
Charges to the city did not cover the cost of treating
indigent patients, though the amount of the loss varied according
the level of care required. Cost to the hospital for the conta-
gious disease ward, for example, was over $16.00 per week per
patient, but the city paid only $3.00.52 General ward patients
cost the hospital $1.85 per day (or $12.95 per week), but the
4gJournal of Common Council Board, 1903, p. 840. Hartford
Hospital consistently received around five times as many patients
as St. Francis. The 1905 Charity Commissioners Annual Report's
lists of people whose hospital board was $12.00 or more in the year
shows that Hartford Hospital treated 379 patients, St. Francis 72
[pp. 23, 27-83. .In 1908 the figures were 127 for Hartford Hospital,
21 for St. Francis [pp. 25-27.1
50See  Public Acts, State of Connecticut (Hartford: State of
Connecticut, 1901, 1903, etc.) for 1901, p. 1405 - 6; for 1903, p.
242. This was not unusual -- the primary hospital in most large.cities (Bridgeport, Danbury, Norwalk, New London, Meriden, etc)
received the same amount.
51Endowed beds were a phenomenon unfamiliar today. A church,
organization or individual, in return for a sum of money had the
right to nominate a patient to occupy a bed and receive care at no
charge. Exactly how this system worked is unclear to me, but it
was a common way to provide treatment to people who could not
afford to pay for all or part of their stay.
52Journal of the Common Council Board, 1903, p. 836.
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1s $7.00 per week.53 The fees for "paying
.OO per week, and even this could be reduced
of deserving patients who . . . very properly
not be expected to apply to the city for
,
fall was met from the hospital's endowment
35.
lie contributions, the deficit at Hartford
nd slowly growing. When it reached alarming
the Board of Directors authorized an appeal
?ns of Hartford, and within three months the
s covered.55 This scare forced the Board to
ibility for day-to-day operations. Adminis-
1 policies were examined and changed where
--.
.
leral the men running the hospital thought,
St time, about the shape they wished the
le future. One of their decisions was to try
tients  who could pay the full cost (and more)
her patient, see Hartford Hosoital  Annual
fee charged to city, see Hartford Hospital
utes (March 21, 1907),  p. 102.
was charged to the income from the "Keney
t h e lVincome from the general fund of the
te appropriation. No information is given
; were selected or how they differed from
rpected  to receive aid from the city.
1 Report, 1904, p. 13.
L Board of Director Minutes, January 30 and
39.
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of their care.56 Although there was no intention of ceasing
to care for the kinds of patients who had been the hospital's
constituency for the past fifty years an? who, the board members
clearly' understood, would continue to compose the bulk of their
clients, making the hospital attractive to middle class paying
patients became a strong secondary objective. Its impact upon
patients with tuberculosis was of major importance in determining
where and what kind of care they would receive, and is discussed
fully in Chapter III.
CONCLUSION
Although a prosperous and growing city,, Hartford at the
beginning of the twentieth century was only in the first stages of
developing a coherent plan for caring for its less fortunate
citizens. Private philanthropy and initiatives had dominated the
provision of aid to the poor throughout the nineteenth century, and
city government was slow and reluctant to assume responsibility for
the poor, especially if they were also ill. Councilmen hesitated
to undertake funding and managing a municipal hospital, and
physicians at Hartford Hospital were unwilling to lose the
'%ee Hartford Hospital  Executive Committee Minutes, 1903 and
1904. The executive committee undertook a myriad of. large and
small tasks such as investigating patient complaints, introducing
a new accounting system, hiring and firing personnel, reorganifing
space to make room for laboratories, promulgating rules for patient
visitors, inspecting the bathrooms, requiring that house staff
attend 8:00 a.m. breakfast, disciplining student nurses, recommend-.ing a new and improved telephone system -- the list goes on and on.
As a new administrative staff was put in place, the committee
gradually withdrew its direct involvement. The Executive Committee
Minutes of July 8 1904 (p. 37) record a vote to accept patients who
wished private rooms and special nursing for $35.00 per week.
reimbursements paid by the city for indigent inpatients even though .i
A fullyfees did not cover the actual cost of providing care. .I,
.
operative city hospital would mean empty beds atH&tford  Hospital,
a prospect the latter's directors must have viewed with alarm.
However, as hospitalization became increasingly accepted by middle
class patients who could pay in full for the services they
received, the directors began to entertain the notion that the
future of their institution lay in attracting this new consituency.
The reluctance by all institutions to provide for the sick
poor showed up most dramatically in the case of destitute consump-
tives. The city sent them to Hartford Hospital whenever possible.
As we will see below, Hartford Hospital first tried to transfer all
of them to the sanatorium it built on the edge of the city. When
that failed, hospital directors admitted the very ill and terminal
cases to special wards at the main hospital and those in the
earlier stages of the disease to the sanatorium. This solution was
problematic andprobablywould not have been successful; fortunate-
ly, a tuberculosis commission recommendedtothe State of Connecti-
cut that state sanatoria should be built and should be open to all
tubercular patients, regardless of stage of disease or ability to
pay. Both the city and Hartford Hospital' greeted this news with
relief and hastenedtotransfer consumptives to the state sanatoria
as soon as they.&began  to open in 1910.
The poor themselves probablytriedto avoid entanglements with
institutional medicine. When admission was inevitable, they may
have preferred Hartford Hospital over a city hospital located in
,
-  I
:I
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the almshouse. As will be discussed below, when a representative
Of the working class became a Tuberculosis Commissioner, he was a
strong proponent of a state sanatorium system. Workingmenwere not
destitute, although tuberculosis in the wage earner could reduce
a family to that condition quickly, and any institution smacking
of the almshouse was doubtless unacceptable to them. If they could
not join together and pay for their own in Hartford Hospital, as
they briefly tried to do, a state institution seemed a better
choice. .
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CHAPTER III
TUBERCULOSIS IN HARTFORD
In Connecticut, tuberculosis mortality continued a half-
century trend of decline in the first decade of the twentieth
century. 1 In Hartford, however, this was not apparent -- consump-
tion fluctuated between the second,and fifth leading Cause of death
between 1896 and 1910, with no discernable pattern.2 Regardless
of improvements elsewhere, for Hartford, tuberculosis mortality
remained a significant problem. In 1901, for example, eleven per
cent of all deaths in the city and 14 percent of deaths at Hartford
Hospital were from tuberculosis.3 It was a disease of the poor,
.and the poor were concentrated in the city. There are no data
.correlating tuberculosis rates and income levels for the period in
Hartford, but by the middle of the decade when it had become a
reportable disease, the health department listed the number of
tuberculosis cases by ward. The case counts in wards containing
tenement districts were always much higher than other parts of the
'TB death rate per 10, 000 in Connecticut decreased from  26.7
in 1849 to 20.6 in 1890 to 13.4 in 1908 [State Board of Health
Annual Report, 1908 (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1909),  p.
37.1
2trHealth  Department, M Municipal Reaister, Citv of Hartford,
Lockwood Brainard, 1912), 516.(Hartford: Case,
was the second leading cause of depth in
Tabl;;'., 1pg'04, lgOIgt
1897,
1903, 190;.
I
1909 and the fifth cause of death in 1902,
3Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1901, p- 42; "Board of
Health Commissioners,1V  Municipal Resister. Citv of Hartford 1901,
p, 343, 348.
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city, a finding which only confirmed what city authorities already
knew -- the sickest were the poorest.4
The city took basic public health measures but does not seem
to have pursued them with much vigor. In 1904 the Health Depart-
.ment required physicians to report cases of tuberculosis, but I
compliance was very slow in coming, and it was not until 1909 that
the number of reported cases exceeded the number of deaths.5  The
1904 actions taken by the Board of Health to limit the spread of
the disease also included an anti-spitting  law, provisions  to
disinfect dwellings in which there had been a tuberculosis death, I
free examination of sputum submitted by physicians, and "literature
about how [patients can] protect themselves and their neighbors
against infection.@V6 By 1910 the number of sputum samples had
risen  to 153 (of which 36 were positive), and the bacteriologist
complained that his laboratory was being used by the city's I
4The reporting was not a case rate (cases per thousand, for
example), but raw case numbers. Thus, a more populated part of the
city was certain to have higher numbers of cases whether or not the
rate was also higher, and the tenement districts were certainly
densely populated. The actual numbers, then, are meaningless for
modern statistical methods.
5'1Health  Commissioners Report," Municipal  Register, City of
Hartford, 1909, p. 571.
6For the reporting requirement, see "Health Department,"
Municioal  Reaister, Citv of Hartford, 1904, p. 406. In 1906 there
were only 73 reported cases but 173 tuberculosis deaths, and the
report comments that "something must be radically wrong"  with the
reporting mechanism [Municipal Resister, City of Hartford, 1906, p.
3961. In 1909 there were 128 cases and 119 deathstrao;rt;z
[Municipal Resister, Citv of Hartford, 1909, p. 5711.
a reportable disease at the state level in 190.9, just before the
first public sanatorium was built. [see Public Acts (Hartford:
State of Connecticut, 1909),  Chapter 79, pp. lOlO-12.1
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physicians to save cost of the doing the examination themselves.'
On the evidence of its annual reports, the Board of Health was not
aggressively involved in the anti -tuberculosis campaign.
Several voluntary organizations dedicated to the disease were
formed before 1910, although they.too  seem not to have been very
active. In 1906, the Executive Committee of Hartford Hospital
directed two of its members to attend a meeting  called by Mayor
Henney "to organize a permanent anti-tuberculosis society. IN8 The
city directory for the same year listed members of the board of a
qlConsumptives  Aid Society I1 which included the Mayor, three Hartford
Hospital board members and fourteen other physicians and business-
men. 9 The National Society for the Study and Prevention of
Tuberculosis (NASPTB) recruited representatives from each state.
In 1908, the first year in which names were given, the Connecticut
contingent included ten Hartford residents (of which three were
alSO  on the Consumptives Aid Society board). 10 Unfortunately,
there is no information about the activities of.any of these
organizations. It seems possible that Mayor Henney's  "anti-
tuberculosis societyl' might have been the same as the Consumptives
'"Health Department Report," Municioal  Reaister, Citv of
Hartford, 1910, p. 501.
*Hartford Hospital Board of Directors Minutes, November 14,
1905, p. 81.
'Geer's Hartford Citv Directory (Hartford: The Hartford
Printing Company, 1906),  p. 952.
"Transactions of the Fourth Annual Me&ins of the National
Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis, (Phila-
delphia: William Fell Co., 1908),  p. 317.
;
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Aid Society. Hartford Hospital records do not indicate that the
Consumptives Aid Society ever assisted with payment of hospital
bills, and the representatives sent to Mayor Henney's  meeting did
not report back. Vigorous anti-tuberculosis campaigns were waged
in some cities before 1910, but Hartford was not among them.l'
Hartford's citizens and physicians were more interested in the
sanatorium that was to be built on the edge of town.
After introducing an immigrant family ravaged by tuberculosis
to illustrate both the individual tragedies the disease caused and
the magnitude of the problem faced by medical authorities, this
chapter describes the relationship between Hartford Hospital and
its sanatorium, Wildwood, in the years between its opening in 1902
and the opening of the first state sanatorium, Cedarcrest, in 1910.
Hartford Hospital's first priority in these years was making the
transition from a nineteenth century custodial care facility to a
modern, acute care, technologically sophisticated institution that
could attract middle class as well as indigent patients. Hampered
by financial difficulties, the hospital was never able to invest
sufficient dollars or personnel in its sanatorium to ensure its
success. Thus, the coming of the state system of sanatoria was
welcomed by the hospital administration, for made it possible to
close wards for chronic, advanced stage consumptives and refer
indigent patients to the state facility.
"See footnote 24, Chapter I, for discussion of and references
for the NASPTB and the anti-l3 public health campaign.
82
TUBERCULOSIS: THE BARBELLA  FAMILY
The Barbella  family represents the experience of many of
Hartford's immigrant poor: Five of the six Barbellas died of
tuberculosis and the sixth died in the almshouse after an eleven
year residence there.12 Unskilled and tubercular, members of the .
family struggled but failed to climb out of impoverishment into a
self-supporting working class status. They were unusual only in
that they left a bureaucratic paper trail for the researcher to
follow eighty years later.
Italian immigrants Cono and Francesca Barbella  had at least
three children born in Hartford at two year intervals between 1888
and 1892. Francesca died of consumption at the age of, 36, in 1894.
Poignantly and not uncommonly, the immediate cause of death was
listed as "exhaustion". She died at home, on Charles Street in the
tenement district, and Cono continued to live in the neighborhood
through the 1890s. He was listed variously as a N'peddlerVV  and
"laborer*  in the city directory in those years. In 1900 all three ,
children (ages 12, 10, and 8) were in the Hartford Orphan Asylum;
at the same time, Rose Barbella, age 66, was an inmate at the
almshouse, 13 where she was to remain until her death in 1911.14
12Documenting  the lives of the very poor is difficult, as they. .are listed in city directories only intermittently If at all and
tend not to use services which leave a bureaucratic paper trail..The story of the Barbellas is reconstructed from their census
entries, death certificates, and city directory listings.
13These were the only Barbellas in the city directory or the
census. Cono was clearly the father of the children; and the
mother of all children is listed as Francesca. Rosa's relationship
to them is guesswork. See 1900 Manuscript Census, reel 136,
enumeration district 539, sheet 2; e.d..185, sheets 18 and 19.
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Could she have been Cone's mother, imported to care for the
children after their mother's death? The family evidently broke '8
up around 1900 -- perhaps Rose became too old or too ill to help
maintain the home, or Cono resumed his peddling after the children
were old enough to place in the orphanage.15
Tuberculosis appeared again among the Barbellas soon after the
turn of the century. The oldest son, Joseph, died of the disease
at Hartford Hospital at the age of 16, in 1904. His death
certificate gave a Front Street address as his home, so the family
had not left the district in which they had lived at the beginning
of their time in Hartford. Four years later, in.1908,  sixteen year
old Mary (whose occupation was given as "laundress") died at the
same hospital, also of tuberculosis. The charity commissioners
paid the hospital $113.14 for her care,16 indicating a fairly
long hospitalization (at $8.00 per week, it works out to around 14
weeks). Cono died two weeks after his daughter in the same ward
of the hospital, of the same disease.- The charity commissioners
did not report paying for his hospital stay, indicating either that
he had the means to pay for himself or, more probably, that he
'*The  Board of Charity Commissioners listed all almshouse
VVinmatesVW  in their annual reports, and Rose appeared every year
from 1900 to 1911. Her death certificate indicates that she died
of uremia. She was thus the only family member not to die of
tuberculosis.
'%t is significant that the 1900 census was taken in June.
Cono could have gone off on a summer selling trip, leaving his
mother and children to be cared for by the city while he was away.
This would save rent. Parents could leave children in the city
orphanage temporarily and reclaim them later.
16Report of the Board of Charity Commissioners, 1909, p. 25.
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entered the hospital only to die and was not there long enough to
run, up a bill of more than $12.00. (The Charity Commission
published names only of'those for whom it had paid this much or
more.) John, the middle child and last surviving Barbella, lived
long enough to acquire a skilled trade. When he died of tuberculo-
sis at the-age of 24 in 1915 in Newington (probably at Cedarcrest,
the new state sanatorium for Hartford County), he was listed as a
blacksmith. Thus an entire immigrant family came and vanished,
leaving only a faint trace in the record. It must have been thatc
way for many: living in crowded, unsanitary tenements, working at
hard and unskilled laboring jobs, dispersing, the family  when
financial need was overwhelming, and eventually losing the
struggle. It was this kind of family that presented formidable
challenges to officials concerned with management of tuberculosis.
TUBERCULOSIS AND HARTFORD HOSPITAL
Care of the tubercular poor was not something willingly or
eagerly undertaken by any agency or institution in Hartford at the
beginning of the twentieth century. St. Francis frankly refused
to admit them. (See above, Chapter II.) The almshouse wished to
make no provision for them, though officials had been forced to
reserve some spaces in a separate part of the building for
consumptive inmates. Hartford Hospital had since its founding
assumed responsibility for institutionalization of the poor,
financing their care in part by city reimbursements and in part
from the hospital's endowment. It was upon Hartford Hospital,
then, that care of the tubercular devolved.
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In 1895, hospital officials publicly recognized for the first
time that something would have to be done about patients with
tuberculosis:
In the near future we must have isolated buildings for
the treatment of consumption. We have had some severe
lessons as to its contagious properties, and if we must
care for this class of patients, we must do so at as
small risk of its conveyance to others as possible.
There is no necessity of an elaborate ornamental struc-
ture
edmlf  but  l  * -
a plain roomy building is what is need-
In this first of what would be eight years of annual pleas
before the hospital's sanatorium, Wildwood, was built, a theme
which will recur throughout the hospital's efforts to care for the
consumptive already appears. There is a reluctance to undertake
the task, and whatever care is given is to be economically
provided. This unenthusiastic commitment would result in an under
funded "plain" establishment on hospital property at the edge of
the city; the obligation to care for these undesirable patients
would be eagerly handed over to the state as soon as state
sanatoria were built.
It should also be noted that consumptives were no more
enthusiastic than hospital officials about institutionalization,
and resorted to it only as a last resort. In 1901, 33 of 52 (63%)
the hospital's tuberculosis cases died, an indication that
admission was often delayed until the disease was terminal. A
survey of 1901 death certificates for Hartford residents indicates
that only 2409 of deaths from tuberculosis occurred in the hospital
"Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1895, p. 17.
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or almshouse.18 People died at home if they could, but families
like the Barbellas probably lacked even the meager resources
necessary to make that choice.
WILDWOOD  SANATORIUM
Something had to be done, for n[e]veryone  of these poor
patients is by reason of his circumstances. unavoidably and
inevitably a source of infection to others" and it was necessary
to "diminish as much as possible the breeding places of this most
deadly of all human maladies."lg Consumptives had to be separat-
ed from the rest of society to protect the healthy, treat the
disease (if it was in the early stages and still treatable), and
teach the patient to live in such a manner that he did not endanger
others. The best place in which to accomplish these goals was a
sanatorium, declared the Connecticut Board of Health, and the fees
Of the poor in such facilities should be publicly funded.20
Hartford Hospital's annual report had pointed out the need for
an institution for the tubercular every year since 1895,  so such
talk in legislative chambers prompted a quick response. Members
of the board appeared before the appropriation committee to ask for
money towards construction of the sanatorium the hospital had
'*The  percentages are stable at least for the years 1901 -
1903, the only years for which I was able to read all Hartford
death certificates. In 1902, 28% and in 1903 23% of TB deaths
occurred in hospitals or the almshouse. Nine to eleven percent of
deaths in the city and 12% to 13% of deaths at Hartford Hospital
were from tuberculosis.
"State Board of Health Annual Report, 1900 (New Haven:
Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, 1901),  p. xxii.
201bid.,  pp. xxi - xxiv
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decided to build on the outskirts of Hartford.21 Board member
Louis Cheney asked the state for help in establishing Ira sort of
an experimental hospital" so that tuberculous patients could be
"isolated from the common run of patients in a hospital." He I
:, -..'T
reminded legislators that an earlier investigating committee had
concluded that rather than one large state-wide facility, it would
be better to have 'Ismaller institutions started in different parts
of the state in conjunction with the hospitals that are already
established."22
After a discussion of charges to the state for the treatment
of indigent patients it supported,23 Dr. Root of, Hartford Hospi-
tal assured the legislators that the proposed sanatorium would be
for "all casesVV of tuberculosis, not just the incipients. Already
21Whether or not Wildwood  was planned before state funds
became a possibility is unclear. Members of the hospital's board
may have been quietly lobbying for years, and when they thought the
timing right they began to raise money from Hartford citizens and
soon thereafter approached the legislature. They may have been
privately assured that their appeal would be looked upon favorably.
Documenting such understandings among the small, interconnected
ruling class of the city and state is almost impossible.
221 could not locate the report of the first investigating
committee to which he referred. For Cheney's  testimony: General
Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Public Hearing of the Joint
Standins  Committee on Appropriations [Stenographer's notes], 1903,
P* 403.
23The  state was to pay $4.00 per week, considerably less than
the regular fee of $7.00 [or $8.00, quoted elsewhere in the
hearings]. Hartford and other towns would pay the same amount for
their indigent. It is not clear for which patients the state paid,
since towns were supposed to pay for their own residents. In
1903, Hartford Hospital treated patients from 84 towns (and charged
all $4.00 per week). See General Assembly of the State of
Connecticut, Public Hearing of the Joint Standina Committee on
Appropriations [stenographer's notes], 1903, p. 403.
i
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$14,000 towards
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the projected construction costs of $40,000 had
been raised by the citizens of Hartford, he went on, and $25,000
from the state would complete what was needed. He also averred
that even if more money than requested was forthcoming, the
proposed size of the sanatorium would not be increased, though the
building might' be built of brick instead of less expensive
wood.24 Having raised $47,804.67, the hospital's board began
construction. There was a slight budget overrun (construction cost
$46,617.95  and furnishings $4,605.97), but no onewastoo concerned
and Wildwood  Sanitorium opened on May 1, 1902. It was staffed by
a head nurse and eight regular nurses, two orderlies, three maids,
a cook and an engineer. Medical attention was provided by a member
of Hartford Hospital's medical house staff who was there from 8:00
a.m. to 6:00 p.m. daily.25
Situated off New Britain Avenue on the southwest side of the
city, Wildwood  had the requisite altitude (it was on Cedar
Mountain), view and rural atmosphere thought to be essential to
recovery. The Hartford Courant rhapsodized,
24General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Public
Hearinas, Joint Standinq Committee of Appropriations [StenO-
grapher's  notes] (January Session 1901),  pp. 405 - 410: The state
also assisted voluntary hospitals in the major cities with biannual
grants which were the same each year and were not discussed by the
appropriations committee. Hartford Hospital's grant from this
source was $10,000, the same amount given to all large hospitals.
Some smaller ones received $5,000. See Public Acts, State of
Connecticut for the relevant years (1901, pp 1405-6; 1903, p. 202;
1909, p. 1040, etc.)
25Hartford  Hospital Board of Directors Minutes, 1902, p. 36-
40; Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1902, pp. 19-20.
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Figure 3: Hartford Hospital's Wildwood  Sanatorium c.1905
[Hartford Hospital Archives]
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It has a fine elevation, is on dry soil and the sur-
roundings of cedars add a healing fragrance to the
atmosphere. The view is superb, covering a wide range
in all directions, and is really one ofzEhe most beauti-
ful spots in the vicinity of Hartford.
The building, designed for fifty patients, was a large
gambrel-roofed, barn-like structure. [See illustration in figure
3, opposite.] A two story central section for administration,
kitchen and dining and bathing facilities was flanked by two one
story wings which contained the men's and women's wards. Each wing
had a south-facing Veranda"  thirty feet long which was roofed but
otherwise open to the air. The wards were simply large rooms with
tall windows; the iron beds were lined up along the sides, six to
eight feet apart. Each wing had three private rooms as we11.27
Although things seemed to begin well, there were ominous signs
of trouble. The first four months revealed problems in running
Wildwood, some of which Hartford Hospital never solved. By the end
. . .
Of September the average daily census was 27, and 69 individuals
had been treated. The sanatorium was not full, and patients did
not stay long. Furthermore, of the patients that had been
discharged, only 12 were considered improved, while 18 were
unimproved and 12 had died. These were not hopeful statistics.
Finally, the hospital found that the actual cost per week per
patient was $9.65, but the average income from each patient was
$3.98. The financial shortfall was considerable.
26Hartford  Courant (May 1, 1902) p. 13.
271bid. The article features several exterior and interior
photographs in addition to a description in the text.
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There were other portents of impendingtroublewhich originat-
ed in the parent institution but would have serious consequences
for Wildwood. Even as the sanatorium opened, Hartford Hospital was
running a deficit and had to appeal to the public for help. The
$74,800 raised in the spring of 1902 covered the debt, but it was
clear that administrative changes would have to be made. Signifi-
cantly, one of the directors argued for a need for a separate part
of the hospital to treat private patients. Although this request
was tabled, attempts to attain financial stability meant that in
the future attention would be paid to what was necessary to attract
paying patients.28
In November 1903, after it had been open for only 18 months,
Wildwood  Sanatorium closed. In its annual report for that year,
Hartford Hospital explained that original proposal for the
sanatorium had been that it treat only incipient cases (although
this is not. what hospital representatives had told the state
appropriations committee). A fundamental mistake had been made by
admitting too many "hopelessV1  cases. "The mortality therefore has
been great, and the recoveries few, 1V confessed the hospitalspokes-
man.2g Indeed, of the 140 people admitted over the course of the
preceding year and a half, only 14 had been classified "incipient"
or "early stage." Mortality had been high, with 37 (26%) dying.
280n the need for facilities for private patients, see
Hartford Hospital  Board of Directors Minutes, Nov. 30, 1901, p.
333 and Dec. 18, 1901, p. 334. On the debt, see Hartford Hospital
Board of Directors Minutes, Jan. 30, 1902, p. 36; March 3, 1902, p.
37; March 29, 1902, p. 39.
2gHartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1903, pp. 21-22.
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And sicker people cost more to care for -- the average cost per
week per patient had increased to $10.08. The Connecticut Courant
summed up the situation crudely but succinctly. After noting that
the finances atwildwood 'Ihad run behind about $15,000 so far," the
reporter got to the point:
To a large extent it [Wildwood] has been. used asTht
comfortable place for hopeless cases to die at.
design of that method of treatment has beenBvt,take  the
incipient cases and drive the disease out. . . . town.
managers have not sent patients at even the low price  of
$4 a week to the hospital, when at $2 or less they could
be kept about the poorhouse, and so the sufferers have
been kept away until too late and have been sent there
only when all broken down. Thus . . . the occasional
incipient case has cleared out as soon as possible
rather than stay by amid 7; many signs ,of extreme
exhaustion and coming death.
Hartford Hospital's problems were bigger than the failure of
Wildwood, however. The financial situation had not improved even
though closing the sanatorium cut receipts by $5,000 and expenses
by $16,00031 Massive reorganization of the hospital began as the
eXeCUtiVe  committee of the board assumed direct daily  management
of the troubled institution. Committee members found chaos and
waste wherever they looked. They instituted vigorous administra-
tive reforms in everything, from.the hour at which house staff were
expected to breakfast, to closing the ice making operation, to
instituting a better bookkeeping system and raising hospital fees.
By the end of 1904 members of the executive committee began to turn
30Connecticut  Courant (November 9, 1903),  p. 7. The Hartford
Courant did not cover the closing of Wildwood.
31Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1903, p. 23-4.
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over most day-to-day responsibility for running the hospital to a
newly hired superintendent.32
By early 1905, the executive committee again identified a need
for a facility to treat consumptive patients. After considerable
discussion .and analysis of fund raising possibilities, they voted
to recommend that Wildwood  be reopened, a recommendation accepted
by the full board on August 1.33 On October 1, 1905, Wildwood
Sanatorium reopened.
my, after such a disastrous first try and when the newly
reorganized institution was still consolidating the changes the
board had made, did the executive committee embark again upon
establishing a sanatorium.3 First and most important, financing was
available. The State of Connecticut provided $15,00034 and John
Gunshanan's  Workingmen's Free Bed Fund provided substantial
32Although  it can only be touched upon here, this period in
the history of Hartford Hospital is of great importance in
understanding how it made the transition from a nineteenth century
to a modern institution. Members of the executive committee were:
William Morgan, MD; Thomas Sisson [replaced by George C.F.
Williams]; Louis Cheney; Phineas Ingalls, MD; Gilbert Heublein and
H. Howard Morse. Their investigations into current conditions at
the hospital and recommendations for change were detailed and far-
reaching. See Hartford Hospital Executive Committee Minutes,
December 16, 1903 [when they begin] to December 21, 1904 [when the
emergency was under control].
33See  Hartford Hospital Executive CommitteeMinutes,  1905,  pp.
57, 64-5, 67; Hartford Hospital Board of Directors Minutes, 1905,
p. 79.
34As before, this was to last for two years. Public Acts,
Sate of Connecticut, 1905, p. 575. The hospital received one more
grant, $40,000 this time, to cover 1907 - 09. Public Acts, State of
Connecticut, 1909, p. 932.
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assistance as well.35 In addition, the city of Hartford had
converted some space  at the almshouse into a r@city hospital"
largely to care for the consumptives Hartford Hospital had refused
for the period of the Wildwood  shut-down, but potentially for the
Care of all city-funded patients. (See Chapter II, above.) We
cannot know whether this specter of competition for patients and
funding from the city was a factor in the decision to reopen
Wildwood, but the timing of the closing of Wildwood, opening Of the
city hospital and subsequent reopening of Wildwood  is suggestive.
Finally, Hartford Hospital was still attempting to attract private
patients.36 If consumptives had to be admitted, it would be
.better to organize their care so they were confined to specified
parts of the hospital. As was to become apparent later in the
decade, even this did not assuage the fears of the paying patients,
but in 1905 it seemed a good compromise.
At the reopened Wildwood, care of patients was managed
differently from what had been done in IgOz-03. Hartford Hospital
.
set aside two wards3' in the hospital proper for r8chronlc'1 cases,
Wards four andwhile "incipients I1 were sent to the sanatorium.
eleven and Wildwood  together were to be considered the *'Tubercular
Hospital" and their funding and staffing were to be kept separate
35See  Chapter IV for a fuller discussion of this matter- The
fund provided $13,158.50  between 1905 and 1907.
Uncmi  tal Executive  Committee  Minutes , 1904, July 8,
:ee voted to "accept patients who wish la1
:ial nursing for $35.00 a week."
rds three and four, later wards four and
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from the general hospital. Applicants for admission had to apply
to the main hospital for examination and classification. They were
admitted to the chronic wards and then transferred to the "annex"
[Wildwood] if their conditions warranted such optimism. There were
40 ward and .eight private beds at Wildwood  and 42 ward and two
private beds in the main hospital.38
The first two years were troublesome and must have worried
Hartford Hospital's Board greatly. By 1907 the deficit was
$22,836.43  and there was little hope of finding a permanent
solution. The Workingmen's Fund was in debt to the hospital (and
would soon cease to contribute at all) and a new state appropria-
tion of $40,000 for 1907 - 09 was achieved only at the cost of
lowering the fees to state patients to $6.00 a week. 39
There were other problems as well. Staffing the tubercular
units had proved difficult. Student nurses (then a major source
of nursing staff) had to be replaced on the chronic wards by
graduate nurses, a much more expensive proposition. Tuberculosis
nursing did not appeal to local nurses; Agnes Kernan  was imported
from Johns Hopkins to be matron at Wildwood  and a new graduate of
the Phipps Institute in Philadelphia, Mary Tierney, was hired to
be head nurse of the most difficult chronic wards. Tierney was
probably a recovered consumptive, since the training program at
Phipps, a prominent center for the study of tuberculosis, recruited
38Detailed  in Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1905, pp. 42-3.
3gHartford Hospital Annual Report, 1907, pp. 20 - 24.
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ex-patients as students. 40 In 1907 the annual report recapitu-
lated the staffing problem:
[The Tubercular Division] continues and will continue to
be the source of many of our worries, on account of the
difficulty in handling the patients to their satisfac-
tion and the difficulty in obtaining a competent corps
of attendants and ward helpers. The attention demanded
by these patients, particularly the advanced cases, is
almost unlimited. Wards 4 and 11 are filled to their
full capacity all the time and usually there is a
waiting list.41
The new system of allocating patients by disease classifica-
tion soon broke down, if it ever worked except to exclude the most
debilitated from the sanatorium. First, a large minority of
patients did not stay even one month -- in 1907,, twenty-two left
in the first 30 days.42 Then, "incipientsl' were difficult to
attract: Of the remaining 57 patients, 28 were classified "moder-
ately advanced" or "advanced." People were not allowed to die
there, however -- they did that elsewhere in the hospital.
Tuberculosis mortality data for Hartford Hospital  are difficult to
interpret accurately, but 57 deaths from tuberculosis were reported
40Barbara Bates, Barqaininq for Life: A Social History of
Tuberculosis, 1876 - 1938 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 1992),  pp. 110-2.
41Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1907,  p. 58. For excusing
student nurses from staffing wards 4 and 11, see Hartford Hospital
Executive Committee Minutes, December 8, 1907, p. 112.
42This  is the only time in the Wildwood  statistics that the
number leaving so soon was given. Usually, Wildwood  conformed to
the customary way of presenting data in which patients were not
counted until after they had been institutionalized for a month.
[see Chapter I, above]
96
in 1907, and none of them occurred at Wildwood. Whether by
death or discharge, the turnover on the chronic wards was much more
rapid than at the sanatorium, although slower than on the general
wards.44 Since these were the patients who were not expected to
get better., one assumes that they either died in the hospital or
were taken home when the outcome was clearly hopeless.
After 1908 there was some improvement. Wildwood  beds were
full. The executive committee hired a full-time, resident
physician for the sanatorium, William Bartlett, a graduate of
Harvard Medical School with sanatorium experience at Saranac and
Stony Wold, two important establishments in the Adriondacks. Under
his administration, admission procedures were simplified and
discipline tightened. Average length of stay atwildwood  increased
to 116 days in 190945,  a positive sign. The daily cost per
patient decreased to $1.37 ($9.45/week) from 1907's rate of $1.55
43For an example of the problem, see Hartford Hospital Annual
Renort, 1907. Page 80, which gives statistics for the hospital as.
a whole, indicates 196 tuberculoses  cases of which 57 died. On
page 59, however, 252 cases are said to have been treated on wards
4 and 11 and an additional 153 at Wildwood, for a total of 375
cases. It is possible that transferring people back and forth
between the wards and Wildwood  meant that individuals were counted
several times. To add to the confusion, death certificates for
City patients who died at Hartford Hospital list all, whether dying
of tuberculosis or another disease, as dying on ward seven!
Hartford Hospital's archivist is as baffled by this last discovery
as I. (telephone interview with Steve Lytle, December 10, 1992.)
44Average  length of stay on wards 4 and 11 was 48 days, for
those at Wildwood  93 days, for general hospital patients 23 days.
Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1907, pp. 52, 59.
45Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1909, p. 151, 154.
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($10.85/week) 46 so that although the deficit continued, it grew
at a slower rate. People with early disease still were not coming
for care in large enough numbers -- in 1909 only 27% of admissions
were so classified, and a third of all patients left before the
.
three months thought to be the minimum necessary for effective
treatment.47 On the whole, however, there was hope for the
future.
If things were improving at Wildwood, the situation at the
main hospital remained difficult. Running the two wards for
.
chronic consumptives was increasingly  expensive, as the hospltalfs
daily average cost per patient of $1.89 48 was offset by a payment
of only $1.00 a day from the city. 49 Worse, the presence of
.tubercular patients at the main hospital '*influences  many other
patients not to enter the hospital," in the opinion of the
board.50 Private patients were a growing source of revenue, and
the board looked forward to the time when the state institutions
"will take all our advanced cases. When this is accomplished one
.
prevailing . . . objection to private patients coming here will be
46Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1909,  p. 60; Hartford
Hospital Annual Report, 1907, p. 59.
47Hartford Hospital Annual Report, 1909, pp. 151, 154.
481bid.,  p. 60.
4gCity rates had been renegotiated in 1907. See Hartford
Hospital Executive Committee Minutes, 1907, p. 102.
50Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1908;p. 55.
51Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1909, p. 59.
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It is thus not surprising that Hartford Hospital’s Board of
Directors was not displeased when, at the end of 1908,  the State
Tuberculosis Commission recommended that a state system of
sanatoria be erected. (This is discussed more fully in Chapter
IV.) Physicians and administrators at Hartford Hospital were eager
to close the main hospital's wards for advanced consumptives and
pleased that the state would open facilities that would accept such
patients. When the state sanatorium opened in Newington in the
spring of 1910, wards four and eleven at the main hospital were
emptied and refitted for other uses. Wildwood's  census dipped
briefly as patients funded by public monies were transferred to
Cedarcrest, but rebounded quickly, and by the fall of 1910 the
deficit of the tubercular department, now consisting only of
Wildwood, was down to $2,238.95.52 By 1912, the executive
committee was happy to report that a fifth of all admissions to
Hartford Hospital were private patients who paid fully for their
care and even provided the hospital with a $12,000 profit.53
Mary Tierney, the Phipps nurse who had been brought to
Hartford to run the chronic tuberculosis wards, was admitted to
Wildwood  as a patient in November of 1910. Her fees were paid by
52Hartford  Hospital  Annual Report. 1910,  p. 46,
53Hartford  Hospital  Executive Committee Minutes, 1912,  p. 53.
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the hospital.54 In 1912 she left Hartford for New York, 55 and
it is not possible to trace her further.
CONCLUSION
The Board of Directors of Hartford Hospital attempted to solve
the problem of how to care for poor tuberculosis patients by
.setting aside space and staff separate from but still controlled
by the main hospital. In isolating tubercular patients from others
.
they were following what was accepted medical practice both then
and now. They did not, however, commit sufficient resources to the
tuberculosis facilities forthemto develop into a self-sustaining,
vital institution. It is instructive to compare Wildwood  with
Gaylord, in Wallingford, a sanatorium which opened at around the
same time and achieved a reputation for excellent patient care.
Gaylord Farm Sanatorium opened in the fall of 1904. Unlike
.Wildwood, it was not part of an existing hospital, but was
. .
sponsored by a group of New Haven physicians and citizens who had
joined to form a New Haven County Anti-Tuberculosis Association in
1902. This dedicated group raised private money and obtained
funding from the state as well, as Wildwood  had. The medical
director, Dr. David Lyman, who received his tuberculosis training
from Dr. Trudeau at Saranac, proved to be energetic and resource-
ful. He was convinced that patients should return to their old
jobs upon discharge and kept careful follow-up data proving that
54Hartford  Hospital Executive Committee Minutes, 1910,  p-144.
55Hartford  Citv Directory, 1912, p. 656F. This was probably
New York state, as the directory usually specified 'INew York City"
when that was the destination.
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they did better at those than at the outdoor employments that were
commonly advocated. This good news earned him publicity both
locally and nationally, and his institution benefitted.
Although Gaylord's records were not available for this study,
its director seems to have been more successful at mobilizing
resources to support his hospital. It remained in the forefront
of treatment, adopting new modalities as they came along, adding.
new buildings and facilities as they were needed. When antibiotics
made sanatorium treatment of tuberculosis unnecessary,  Gaylord's
physical plant was used for other medical purposes -- it is now a
center for physical rehabilitation. Wildwood, on the other hand,
continued to operate at a loss and closed quietly  in 1939 because
of low occupancy.57
Gaylord benefitted from being the sole responsibility and
interest of its Board of Directors. It was not, as Wildwood  was,
a bothersome subsidiary always with a nagging deficit to be made
up, a distraction from the more important (and profitable) project
of improving patient care and attaining technical sophistication
for a rapidly growing general hospital. This is not to accuse
56David R. Lyman, "From Consumption to Tuberculosis in
Connecticut,** The Heritage  of Connecticut Medicine (New Haven:
Connecticut Medical Society, 1942),  pp. 188 - 201. That Lyman,
director of Gaylord, was chosen to write the article is an
indication of his prominence in state medical circles. The
tuberculosis literature of the 1905 - 35 period contains many.
papers by Lyman, and even a few by Florence Burgess, the nurse who
ran Gaylord with him until her death in 1939.
57File in Hartford Hospital Archives: "Allen, William --
Wildwood  Sanatorium." The sanatorium building was torn down, and
the site now houses a retirement complex, Avery Heights. Most
residents do not know that there ever was a sanatorium  there.
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Hartford Hospital's Directors of malevolence towards or willful
neglect of tubercular patients. To the contrary, that Wildwood
.remained open as long as it did, never raising its rates higher
than the $7.00 a week they had been since it opened, speaks well
..of the parent institution's willingness  to continue a program that
served so few. Demographic data for Wildwood's patients is
unavailable, but it must have been a haven for people unable to pay
for care at far away, expensive sanatoria but willing to make a
modest financial sacrifice rather than send a loved one to a state
institution.
Dr. Lyman was clearly the right person at the right time for
Gaylord's success, but his power was enhanced by being in full
charge of a facility that was dedicated to only one purpose.
Wildwood's  medical directors had to compete with other departments
for funding, staffing and attention, and care of the tubercular was
not a priority as Hartford Hospital evolved into an increasingly
complex operation.
Wildwood  and Gaylord thus presented conflicting evidence of
the success of privately managed sanatoria. Both had received
generous state funding, and it must have been clear to legislators
that they would continue to require considerable public support.
Given the equivocal results of this first attempt by the state to
ensure that indigent consumptives received adequate care, it is not
Surprising that a State Tuberculosis Commission was appointed in
1907 to investigate and recommend other approaches to the problem.
.
The findings of this commission, and the participation  on it of a
representative of working class people is the subject of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
CHARITY, POLITICS AND TUBERCULOSIS
Most historians agree that one of the agendas of progressive
era reform was to control immigrants and the urban working class.
A related question is whether and howthetargets of social welfare
were able to affect decisions which influenced their lives, such
as what kind of treatment they might receive should they contract
tuberculosis. The urban poor probably had little energy to devote
to even attempting to understand legislation and initiatives
undertaken by social workers and bureaucrats on their behalf, but
labor unions and citypoliticalmachines represented and negotiated
working class interests.
A history of the labor movement in Hartford has yet to be
written, but in the first decade of this century such unions as
there were (and the movement seems not to have been strong) l were
apparently unable to address matters of health.2 There is no
'The union movement at the Cheney silk mills in nearby
Manchester, for example, had been crushed by 1902. See John
Sutherland, "'One Loom or No Looms!': The Cheney Velvet Weavers'
Strike of 1902 and the Limits of Benevolent Paternalism" Connecti-
cut History 33 (November 1992): 1 - 37.
2They had more immediate worries about the dangers of the
workplace -- it took until 1913 for Connecticut to pass a Workmen's
Compensation Law. See Robert Asher, "Connecticut's First Workmen's
Compensation Law", Connecticut History 32 (November 1991): 25-49.
Even paternalistic employers were reluctant to pay compensation for
accidents, and sick benefits were not a consideration at all. See
Robert Asher, wThe Limits of Big Business Paternalism: Relief for.
Injured Workers in the Years before Workmen's Compensation," in .
Dyinq  for Work: Workers' Health and Safety in Twentieth Century
,
I
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evidence inHartfordthat "labor joined withmiddle-class reformers
to argue for a new definition of the intimate relationship between
the health of workers and the health of the general co~unity,~*  as
happened elsewhere.3 Even in those places in which labor and
reformers did raise the issue of tuberculosis, the focus was upon
a healthier workplace, not assistance for sick workers.4  At least
before 1910, organized labor did not initiate discussions about
what kind of care should be available for consumptive workers.
The other obvious voices for sick workers were their benevo-
lent associations. These, connected with fraternal groups or
places of employment, might have tried to negotiate on behalf of
their members; indeed, Hartford Hospital documents indicate that
one such group, the Workingmen's Benevolent Association,5  did
raise money to subsidize care of its consumptive members at
Wildwood. John Gunshanan, chief fund raiser of the WBA, is of
special interest in the context of this paper, for the governor of
Connecticut appointed him to be one of the first tuberculosis
commissioners in 1907. Gunshanan's  evolution from supporting a
America, eds David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987),  pp. 19-33.
3David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, "The Early Movement for
Occupational Safety and Health,
in America, ed.
1900-1917,"  in Sickness andN;;;;fz
Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald L.
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985),  p. 515.
41bid. Nowhere in the article cited is there mention of
sickness benefits. Workmen's Compensation Laws paid for injury, not
illness.
51t was not a typical benevolent association, however, as will
be discussed below.
F
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small, local sanatorium to advocating a system of state institu-
tions parallels the change in public policy regarding sanatorium
care for the poor. It also exemplifies how representatives of
working class interests could align themselves with mainstream
reformist.thinking.
Gunshanan was probably appointed to the Tuberculosis Commis-
sion because of the political position enjoyed both by himself and
by other members of his family, especially one of his brothers,
Michael. Michael rose from almshouse storekeeper to city charity
commissioner, a progress which illustrates how dispensing public
charity could be a route to economic stability and political power.
The careers of both men demonstrate that patronage jobs in the new
bureaucracies offered opportunities for members of the rising
working class to influence the ways in which policies were actually
implemented; this was particularly true in agencies which dispensed
charity. Further, holders of some patronage jobs, such as
tuberculosis commissioners, both created and carried out public
policy. Appointees to such positions could express the concerns
of workers and directly affect their lives as well.
Although there is no information about how Hartford's
patronage system worked, it is evident that in other places the
stakes could be very high indeed. In 1916, the director of
Chicago's municipal sanatorium committed suicide because he had
been forced out of his position after a dispute with a new mayor
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over the awarding of contracts for supplying the sanatorium.6
Considered as businesses with money to spend and therefore power
to wield, both the almshouse and the sanatorium could be bases for
political influence and personal aggrandizement.
The Gunshanan brothers are examples of the "making good" story
so common in American folklore. Their lives are recounted in
detail to provide a flavor of social mobility in turn-of-the-
century Hartford and to illustrate how representatives of the
working class became participants in progressive social reform.
THE GUNSHANAN  FAMILY
The patriarch, James Gunshanan,' first appeared in the
Hartford City Directory in 1866, living in the back part of 44
Temple Street and working as a porter.' Temple Street was in the
heart of downtown Hartford's tenement district, and James spent his
6Graham Taylor, "The Civic Martyrdom of Dr. Sachs,'1 The Survey
36 (April 22, 1916): 106-6; "The Death of Dr. Sachs," The Modern
Hospital 6 (May 1916): 343-4.
'The surname is variously spelled Gunshanan, Gunshannan,
Gunshanon, etc. at different times. I have used Gunshanan
throughout because that is how John Gunshanan spelled it when the
Tuberculosis Commission of which he was a member published its
findings in 1908.
8I have pieced together the story of the Gunshanan family by
following them inthe  City Directories and manuscript censuses. To
cite every fact gleaned from these sources would be laborious for
reader as well as author, so this general footnote will cover the
entire section. I consulted the Hartford City Directory for every
year between 1866 and 1981 (when the last remaining members of the
family vanish from the city). The U.S. Census for the years 1880
(reel 98, enumeration district 19, sheet 33A),  1900 (reel 137:
enumeration district 179, sheet 6A & B, 13A; e.d. 180, sheet 2B;
e.d. 184, sheet 16B), 1910 (reel 133: enumeration district 176,
sheet 4A; e.d. 183, sheet 19B; e.d. 191, sheet 23B; e.d. 193, sheet
5A) .
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first few years at various addresses in that neighborhood.g  He
had come to the United States in 1857 at the age of 18, and had
first lived in New York City, where he met and married Elizabeth
(Bridget) Riley, also an immigrant.lO They were accompanied to
Hartford -by his brother Bernard, a teamster who owned his own
business. Bernard left the city after a few years and James
acquired the business, an ideal one for making the acquaintance of
people of all social backgrounds.
By 1878, James, Bridget and their now large family had moved
to 19 Affleck Street, near Zion Cemetery in the 8th Ward, away from
the tenements of their first years. They were to remain in this
neighborhood for the rest of their lives, and when their male
children became independent, they also remained in Frog Hollow, as
that part of the city was (and is still) kn0wn.l' When the Gun-
shanans moved to Affleck Street, they moved out of the ethnically
mixed tenement district and into an almost purely Irish community,
among people with surnames such as Boyle, Farley, O'Neill, Booley.
Most men were skilled workers: stone masons, carpenters, machin-
'Information about neighborhoods is from reading the census
sheets for adjoining buildings and streets and from consulting the
Atlas of the Citv of Hartford CT (Springfield MA: L.J. Richards &
co., 1896 and 1909). These atlases are very detailed, providing
the researcher with information such as the material from which a
structure was built (stone, brick or wood), whether it was detached
or a row house, how large its lot was, and whether there were
outbuildings. Names of property owners are indicated, as well as
of factories, churches, schools and large stores.
"Mrs. Gunshanan identified herself as rBridgetll  to census
enumerators and in the city directory after she was widowed.
111 was only able to trace children who retained the Gunshanan
name -- the six males, since all daughters married.
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ists. The Gunshanans seem to have fit in well; their family was
a little larger than most, and Bridget told the census enumerator
that she could both read and write, accomplishments not attained
by many of her female neighbors, though almost all men were
literate.. They were a hard working, sociable and intelligent
family.
In 1880 several incomes contributed to the support of the
Gunshanan family. The census taker found James and Bridget with
eleven children (the twelfth would be born in 1883) ranging in age
from 3 to 21. The three oldest children were employed: Michael,
21, was a screw maker; Mary, '17, was working in a shop; her twin,
Thomas, worked in a machine shop, probably hoping to emulate his
older brother in a skilled trade . The younger children were all
at school. Between 1880 and the next census record in 1900, James
purchased a home 20 Affleck Street. The "express business" was
his, and he "numbered among his friends some of Hartford's leading
citizens.1112 James' influence was informal, but it probably
prepared the way for the next generation to reap the rewards of
political patronage.
Thomas, the second oldest son, either benefitted from his
father's political connections or forged his own. However he
managed it, he began the public service which would assure middle
class status for both himself and other family members. Having
worked as a screwman  like his older brother, he married around
12Marv Morris Obituary Scranbook, volume 59, p. 32. [at
Connecticut Historical Society].
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1885, and moved around the corner to 67 Ward Street in 1889. In
this year, at the age of 27, he became a city councilman. Between
1889 and 1895 he served three terms as councilman (during one he
was the president of the common council) and then two terms as
alderman, representing the eighth ward in both cases. He was
politically active and influential for all of his long life; his
1950 obituary called him the "Mayor of Frog Hollow." His reward
for meritorious civic service was a job was in the customs
department, which he entered as a clerk in 1896; by 1900 he was
Deputy Customs Collector and eventually became the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Customs for Connecticut in 1925. An appointment that
would be of importance to his brothers, however, had occurred in
1895, when he served briefly on the Board of Relief (which would
become the Board of Charity Commissioners the following year.)13
Although Thomas did not continue to hold a position on this board,
he may have been there long enough to secure a position on the
staff of the almshouse for his brother, Michael.
The oldest Gunshanan son, Michael first appeared in the city
directory as "almshouse storekeeper" in 1897, and although there
is no proof, it is surely not a coincidence that his brother Thomas
had been, however briefly, a member of the Board of Charity
13This information. is from his obituary, Hartford Times,
February 6, 1950, p. 22. His political career, which will not
further concern us here, was distinguished. He was active in
Democratic politics all his life. He chaired the Washington
Street School District in 1914  (serving on the district board from
1900 to 1921), and was later involved in the planning and building
of Bulkley and Weaver High Schools.
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Commissionersi and that his father knew some of "Hartford's most
influential men.VV  Michael was around 37 years old at the time of
his appointment, as yet unmarried. (He was to marry at the age of
45, in 1905.) Michael's title soon changed from "Keeper  of the
Storehouse" to **Investigator for the Charity Board,"  but probably
his daily activity did not change. He was the one who decided
which applicant would receive what at the almshouse, a position of
enormous power and influence. He was apparently not a rigid
bureaucrat, for "while a strict observer of the laws governing the
charity department, many a time his big heart superseded certain
provisions of that law, because no man, woman or child that met him
. . . left without receiving aid."15 By the time of his death in
1926, he had become President of the Board of Charity Commission-
ers. His involvement with and power within the charity bureaucracy
may account for the tuberculosis-related work of his younger
brother, John, the fourth son and sixth child of James and Bridget.
It is he with whom this paper is most concerned.i6
14Michael's  obituary says he was "city storekeeper" beginning
in 1892. This may be an error, or his brother or father may have
obtained the position for him that early. The city directory does
not list him as llstorekeeperlV until 1897. His obituary appears in
Hartford Times, April 5, 1926, p. 20.
i51bid.
16This  accounts for 3 of the 6 sons (Thomas the Customs
Commissioner, Michael the Charity Commission Investigator, and John
who will be discussed at length below.) The other three were:
James, an expressman and printer, remained single and lived with
his widowed mother until his death in 1921 at age 52; Terrance,  a
butcher and eventually the owner of a market, married late and,died
childless in 1941 at the age of 70; Joseph, who worked for an ice
cream and soda company and died unmarried at 29 in 1904. Bridget,
their mother, lived first with James and then with a widowed
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John was born in 1868 and was nine years younger than Michael
and five younger than Thomas. He must have worried his hard
working family, for his early adult years seem to have been rather
aimless. The city directory listed him as a printer between 1883
and 1887., when he was between 15 and 20 years old; this was
probably an apprenticeship. The printing business did not attract
him, for from 1886 to 1897 he was listed as a nbaseballist.l'
Apparently domestic responsibilities made it necessary to make.
another change, for in 1900, when he told the census enumerator he
was a newspaper reporter, he had a wife and five children, aged one
to seven. They lived at 17 Affleck, across the street from his
parents. John's rented flat was in a small three story build-
ing17 with two other families; we have the impression of a not
too prosperous growing family (two more children were to be born,
though only five of the seven lived to adulthood), living in a
crowded apartment in a decent working class neighborhood.
However, although John may not have been financially very success-
ful, he was beginning to be a presence on the political scene.
JOHN GUNSHANAN  ANB THE WORKINGMEN'S CLUB
In August of 1902, 34 year old John Gunshanan chaired the
committee which welcomed President Theodore Roosevelt to Hartford.
He presented a 'qmammoth floral horseshoe [given] by Hartford
daughter before dying at 86 in 1925.
17The  building still stands, now numbered 165 Affleck. His
parents' home, 20 Affleck, is now number 178. Atlas of the Citv of
Hartford (Springfield, MA: L.J. Richards, 1920) plates 7 and 11.
;
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workingmen" and was personally thanked by the President.18
Opportunities to participate in such a momentous event were not
given to minor political figures. John must have had considerable
standing in the Democratic party.
His power came, in part at least, from his leadership in an
organization in which the mayor of Hartford, William Henney, was
3,
also involved, the Workingmen's Club." Exactly what this was is
unclear, since no club records could be located, but it seems to
have been a working class version of the Civic Club -- Gunshanan's
obituary indicates that he and the club lobbied for public baths
in Pope Park, all night trolley service, and other projects "to
make conditions better for the people of Hartford.It2'
We know with certainty of at least one thing the club did
superbly well between 1903 and 1907: it collected the then
considerable sum of $11,00021 to pay for the institutional care
of consumptive workingmen and the support of their families. The
money was raised through a subsidiary organization, the Working-
18John Gunshannon [sic.] obituary, Hartford Times, August 5,
1930, p. 20.
lgGeneral Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Public
Hearinus before the Joint Standinq Committee on Humane Institutions
[typescript, stenographer's notes], (January session 1911), p. 39.
20Hartford  Times, August 5, 1930, p. 20.
21Dollar amount given by Gunshanan in his testimony. See:
General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Hearinss Before the
Joint Standinq Committee on Apnronriations  [stenographer's notes],
(January Session, 1907),  p. 312. As will be mentioned later,
Hartford Hospital acknowledged more than this, $13,158.50.
,’
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men's Benevolent Association,22 the officers of which were
skilled workers employed in Hartford factories: in 1905 they were
three filers at the Colt factory, a toolmaker at Pope's, a Colt
assembler and a "helper" at a home furnishings store at 61
Asylum.23 The Workingmen's Fund, "started first in Hartford and
promoted largely by the indefatigable work of Mr. John Gunshanan,"
raised money "by subscriptions from the men in the shops.'lz4
William Henney explained,
There was a good deal of [tuberculosis] in the shops and
that West End [Working-men's] Club took up the matter of
the disease among their shopmates and they organized an
association to fight it and they got the manufacturers
interested in it. The result was that they passed the
hat in the shop and took up a collection and contributed
a certain amount and the manufacturers agreed to con-
tribute as much as the workingmen.
raised a large amount of money.2.5
In that way they
John Foster, an admiring New Haven physician, described
Gunshanan and his work at a national tuberculosis symposium in
"it was expended by "The  Workingmens Fund" or "The Working-
mens Free Bed Fund.*' How all the sub-groups related to each other
is unknown.
23Hartford Citv Directorv, 1905, p. 973. This is quite
unusual. Officers of all other l'Benevolent  AssociationsVV  (most
large factories and even some stores had them) were from manage-
ment. The official Colt Mutual Benefit Association's 1904
officers, for example, were a superintendent, a foreman, the
purchasing agent, and the president of the company. [Hartford Citv
Directorv, 1904, p. 9511 Entries in the directory listed names of
the officers, cross-checking with their individual entries yielded
their occupations or positions.
24Report of Special Commission to Investisate Tuberculosis
(Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1908),  p. 44.
25General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Public
Hearings before the Joint Standing Committee on Humane Institutions
(1911),  p. 39.
.
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1908. Gunshanan went to 'Ione of the largest manufacturing
concerns,** explained to the owner that he had a plan "for the
relief of sufferers from tuberculosis in his neighborhood,l' and
requested permission to solicit contributions from the men in the
mill. Having secured their donations, he returned to the owner and
"had the sum doubled through the generosity of the public-spirited
proprietor." In this fashion all the factories in Hartford were
approached and a large amount of money was raised.26
A talented organizer and publicist, by 1908 Gunshanan was
beginning to raise money for his cause throughout the state. Dr.
Foster reported upon an event in New Britain which Gunshanan had
arranged. Its owners donated the use of the opera house, a brass
band gave a concert, the Governor of the State gave a short
address, and after more music
Mr. Gunshannon [sic.] addressed the people in his own
style, and he knows how to do it. I cannot do it as he
does. It is well to leave the matter to him. After
this introduction in New Britain, Mr. Gunshannon will go
among "the boys," as they are familiarly called, find
the right ones, and these will go to work as a committee
in their town and do what they can under Mr. Gun-
Shannon's guidance to secure voluntary subscriptions for
their local fund. Next Wednesday an entertainment will
be held in Bridgeport, anc3,so  the work is being carried
throughout the state....
26J.P.C.  Foster, in a symposium "With a State Sanatorium
Secured, What Next?" Transactions of the Fourth Annual Meetins  of
the National Association for the Study and Prevention of Tuberculo-
sis (Philadelphia: William F. Fell Co., 1908),  p. 57.
271bid. Foster went on to describe [p. 581 Gunshanan's  state
wide fund-raising efforts, and it sounds like a prototype of
today's United Way appeals in the workplace: "[Gunshanan] has
prepared a card upon which the giver can signify how much he is
willing to give, and with the permission of the proprietors of the
factories he gives the superintendents packs of these cards, with
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This was organizing at its most effective, except that the
purpose was not the formation of a union or the election of a
particular political candidate (although those goals may have been
present as well), but an admirable (and ostensibly non-partisan)
attempt to assist people with a dreaded disease. John Gunshanan
proved he could mobilize people around this issue. He was rewarded
by an appointment to the State Tuberculosis Commission when it was
formed in 1907.
The appointment must have been approved by the medical
community, which also appreciated Gunshanan's activities and
publicly recognized him for them. In 1905, Hartford Hospital's
Board of Directors passed a resolution in appreciation of the
"intelligent, energetic and successful efforts of Mr. John F.
Gunshanan toward establishing and organizing the Free Bed Fund for
the Tuberculosis Hospital at Cedar Mountain [Wildwood]."
Recipients were also aware of his work on their behalf; patients
at Wildwood  awarded him a "gold badge" of gratitude in 1907.2g
The money Gunshanan raised was in fact of substantial
assistance in the early years of Wildwood  Sanatorium -- William
Henney credited the Workingmen's Fund with making the 1905
the understanding that one shall be placed upon the bench of each
workman and workwoman; subsequently they are collected by the
superintendent and returned to him." Donations were not deducted
from workers' pay, however.
28Board of Directors, Hartford Hosnital  Minutes, (November 14,
1905),  p. 81.
2gJohn F. Gunshanan Obituary, Hartford Times, August 5, 1930,
p. 20.
116
reopening of the sanatorium possible: "These workingmen got a fund
together and got that sanitarium [sic.] opened and sent men there
from all over the city....n30 Financial data given in Hartford
Hospital's annual report of 1907 supports Henney's  contention:
Between 1905 (when Wildwood  reopened) and 1907, the state contrib-
uted $15,000, the Workingmen's fund $13,158.50,  the city of
Hartford $11,408.64  and paying patients $10,403.40.31 Thus,
between 1905 and 1907 Gunshanan's  fund paid for more patients than
did the city of Hartford.
This is not to say that the money provided by the Workingmen's
Fund was sufficient; the same annual report notes that for every
$7.00 paid by the Fund the hospital contributed $5.00 -- a
situation with which the hospital was not happy.32 The inade-
quacy of the resources provided by workingmen to meet the needs of
their fellows at Wildwood  is clear from Hartford Hospital's annual
reports. Although the relationship had begun well, with a glowing
expression of appreciation of the "Working Man's Fund" in 1905,33
by 1907, the unpleasant reality was clear:
It is obvious from the account rendered, however much we
may sympathize with and desire to encourage the merito-
rious self-respecting and generous effort of the work-
ingmen to give protection, support and . . . care to their
unfortunates who have contracted Tuberculosis [sic.], we
30General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, Public
Hearinss before the Joint Standins  Committee on Humane Institutions
[stenographer's notes], (January session 1911),  p. 39.
31Hartford  Hospital Annual Reoort, 1907, p. 23.
321bid.
33Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1905, p. 19.
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are not justified in continuing to extend to them the
financial credit and assistance we have contributed
since March 1st. [There follows a financial summary
showing Hartford Hospital's deficit in running Wild-
wood.] The beneficiaries of the Workingmen's Fund have
received their proportion of this largesse. For every
one of their patients for which they have actually paid
seven dollars per week,
uted-over five....34
the Hospital [sic.] has contrib-
This was the final comment by the hospital about money received
from the Workingmen's Fund, though in 1908 and 1909 the Fund
appeared as a line item under contributions.35 As noted above,
Cedarcrest opened in 1910 and Wildwood  patients who were supported
by public funds were sent there -- presumably this included those
who had been recipients of the free beds of the Workingmen's fund.
JOHN GUNSHANAN  AND THE TUBERCULOSIS COMMISSION
In 1907, Governor Woodruff, a Republican, appointed a special
ten-man commission36 to investigate the tuberculosis problem.
The chair, Dr. Foster, had been executive director of Gaylord
34Hartford  Hospital Annual Report, 1907, p. 23. It should be
noted that $7.00 per week was the usual patient fee for Wildwood.
35The  sum, $2,085.80, was the same both years. Either there
was a very large amount of money on deposit and this represents the
income (unlikely though possible), or an error was made and the
1909 entry was copied direct from that of 1908. I tend to the
latter view, and suspect that no funds were supplied in 1909.
361n addition to Gunshanan, they were: John P.C. Foster, MD
(chair, from New Haven), William J. Brennan (New London), Horace B.
Cheney (Manchester), Albert P. Dossin (Meriden), Charles E. Julin
(secretary, no town listed), Arthur R. Kimball (Waterbury), Omer
La Rue, MD (Putnam), Stephen J. Maher, MD (New Haven), Rev. James
B. Nihill (Bridgeport). Report of Special Commission to Investi-
crate Tuberculosis, 1908, p. 86.
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Sanatorium near New Haven;37 Gunshanan was the only Hartford
resident on the commission. The relative lack of Hartford
representatives, especially the absence of any physicians from
Hartford Hospital, implies either that the Hartford medical
community was unwilling to participate in decisions about the
treatment of tuberculosis or that Governor Woodruff was not a
champion of Wildwood  Sanatorium as an example of how to deal with
the tuberculosis problem. Suggestive as such political consider-
ations are, the intricacies of the appointment process are lost to
the historian, and we cannot know with certainty why the commission
was constituted as it was. After the commission's report was
accepted, Gunshanan was one of three commissioners (again, the only
one from Hartford) appointed to the "Board of Directors to
Establish County Homes for the Care and Treatment of Persons
Suffering from TuberculosisVf38 empowered to implement the recommen-
dations.
37David Lyman, @'The Work of the State Tuberculosis Commission,
its Development and Present Outlook," Proceedings of the Connecti-
cut State Medical Society (New Haven: Ct. State Medical Society,
19X),  p.196. Foster died in 1910; Lyman implies that the cause of
death was tuberculosis.
38The  others were George H. Knight, MD, of Lakeville and
George E. Hall of New Haven. Hall was replaced by Stephen Maher,
MD of New Haven in 1911. Report of Board of Directors to Establish
Countv  Homes for the Car and Treatment of Persons Sufferins from
Tuberculosis (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1910 and 1912),
title pages.
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The Tuberculosis Commission. issued three substantial reports
to the General Assembly between 1907 and 1912;3g  the first of
these .proposed  establishing a sanatorium in each county of the
state and the last two reported upon implementation. By 1912,
sanatoria-had been established on the Hartford-Newington  city line
(Cedarcrest) and in Meriden (Undercliff), Norwich (Uncas-on-
Thames), and Shelton (Laurel Heights). There were also plans for
a special sea-side facility for the treatment of consumptive
children.40 Further, legislation was in place which provided
mechanisms to approve building sites for future sanatoria and to
inspect existing facilities, public and private, along with
regulations for the selection, admission and funding of tubercular
patients.41
The evolution of thought about how to provide care for
indigent consumptives is apparent both in Gunshanan's  work and in
the findings of the commission. He must have realized quite soon
that mutual benefit organizations, no matter how successful, would
not be able to support the number of working class consumptives in
3gReport of Snecial Commission appointed to Investisate
Tuberculosis (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1908);Report  of
Board of Directors to Establish County Homes for the Care and
Treatment of Persons Sufferinq from Tuberculosis (Hartford: State
of Connecticut, 1910); Report of Board of Directors to Establish
County Homes for the Care and Treatment of Persons Suffering from
Tuberculosis (Hartford: State of Connecticut, 1912.)
401t was finally built in 1920, in Niantic and called "Sea-
side."
41These laws evolved between 1907 and 1913. The best summary
is "An Act Concerning the State Tuberculosis Commission,VV  Chapter
183, Public Acts of the State of Connecticut (Hartford: State of
Connecticut, 1913) p. 1781 - 4.
La
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need, for he lobbied for state assistance for both Wildwood  and its
counterpart for the New Haven area, Gaylord, in 1907 and 1909.42
AS he met with workingmen around the state, he must have understood
that the extent of the need was greater than he had realized. That
broader view of the magnitude of the problem, coupled with
disappointment at what workingmen themselves could accomplish,
informed his work on the commission.
The commission's findings document the rapidity of the change
in the official position about the care of poor consumptives. The
state had begun, in 1902, by subsidizing care at Wildwood  and
Gaylord, small independently operated facilities; in 1907 the
commission was appointed; by 1909 its recommendation to establish
a system of state-run and funded sanatoria had been accepted. The
first of these, Cedarcrest, opened in 1910 to serve the people of
Hartford County.
With Cedarcrest's arrival, Wildwood  no longer received
financial support either from the state or from Gunshanan's
Workingmen's  Fund. Gunshanan had transferred the focus of his
concern for working people with tuberculosis from the private to
the public sector. He was a working class progressive reformer.
CONCLUSION -- GUNSEANAN, THE WORRINGMEN'S CLUB AND TUBERCULOSIS
For unknown reasons, when John Gunshanan's term was up in
1913, Governor Baldwin, a Democrat, did not reappoint him, and he
did not secure public office again. How Gunshanan supported his
42General Assembly of the SUU,, VL Connecticut Hearinss
Before the Joint Standing Committee on AnnronriatioAs  [steno-
grapher’s notes], (January Session 1907 and January Session 1909).
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family before and after his tenure as tuberculosis commissioner is
unclear. He may have drawn a salary from the Workingmen's Club,
for the city directory called him an "advertising agent" and
'lpromotor,  Workingmen's Club" between 1902 and 1908. The Working-
men's Club maintained a reading room on Affleck street until 1915;
that there were sufficient funds to rent space suggests that he at
least had a base of operations and perhaps also a salary. The club
seems to have had a large membership, for when Gunshanan was not
reappointed to the Tuberculosis Commission, some 2500 people
attended a "testimonial reception" for him. 43 Even if Gunshanan
was paid by the Club, however, after 1915 'the  reading room
disappeared permanently from the city directory. He was only
around 48 years old then, and how he passed the remainder of his
life (he died in 1930, age 62) is unknown.
Regardless of how John Gunshanan spent the years after his
service as a Tuberculosis Commissioner, for six years in the prime
of his life a combination of political influence and commitment to
the cause of working class people suffering from tuberculosis
provided him with both prestige and a substantial income.44 It
430bituary, Hartford Times, August 5, 1930, p. 20.
44Probably  $2500.00 per year. "Act  Concerning the State
Tuberculosis Commission,11  p. 1783 gives this amount for 1913. It
was unspecified in the earlier acts, but since the 1913 act
repeated earlier provisions, I assume the salary had not changed.
It was a good sized income for the time: In 1910, his brother
Michael was paid $1350.00 as Investigator for the Board of Charity
Commissioners; the Superintendent of the Almshouse received
$2,000.00 annually. [Board of Charity Commissioners Annual Report,
1910, p. 33 - 35.1 The physician-superintendent of Hartford
Hospital was paid $2500.00 per year [Hartford Hospital Executive
Committee Minutes, January 25, 1909, p. 124.1
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is perhaps ironic that the Governors under which he served as
commissioner (Woodruff, Lilley and Weeks) were all Republicans and
that when a Democrat (Baldwin) was finally elected he was not
reappointed. Gunshanan's political roots and power were based
locally, in Hartford, however -- Ignatius Sullivan and William
Henney were mayors from 1902 to 1908, and it must have been the
Hartfordmachinethatwas rewarded by his appointment as Tuberculo-
sis Commissioner. He in turn paid his political debts -- Cedar-
crest, the first state sanatorium, was built just outside Hartford
in 1910. Determining how patronage was channelled through land
purchases and building contracts is not part of,this paper, but we
might expect that an investigation of the construction of Cedar-
crest would reveal that partisan obligations were met.
Tracing John Gunshanan's use of the Workingmen's Club to
further his political career should not obscure the significance
of the financial contributions made by hundreds of people from
their factory benches. Indeed, his very success indicates the
deeply felt need for a shield against tuberculosis on the part of
such contributors. It is also important to note that their
attempts collectively to insure themselves for care in the event
that they contracted tuberculosis did not imply any ideological
commitment to private care. In fact, if John Gunshanan truly
represented his constituency, his support for a state-wide system
of public sanatoria suggests that what working people, at least in
Hartford, wished to avoid was CITY funded, almshouse-based care.
Along with him, they must have hoped that the new state facilities
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would provide effective, humane treatment for all citizens without
the stigma associated with the municipal almshouse.
John Gunshanan and his constituents came to understand that
working people, even when they banded together, could not provide
the resources necessary to care for the consumptives among them.
Since the city had not shown itself willing to move a city hospital
out of the stigmatized almshouse, and Hartford Hospital supported
its sanatorium reluctantly, the state was the only alternative.
Note, however, that Gunshanan accepted the premise that sanatorium
care was necessary. He was neither a radical nor a visionary; he
did not raise funds to support consumptives in their homes or
agitate for higher pay so that workers could afford to be ii1 or
to seek care early. Negotiators and coalition-builders by
definition work 'within the system, and within those limits
Gunshanan was effective.
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CONCLUSION
. ..danger-beliefs are as much threats which one man uses
to coerce another as dangers which he himself lfears  to
incur by his own lapses from righteousness....
Disease, with its seeming randomness, is one aspect of
the indeterminable universe that we wish to distance
from ourselves. To do so we must construct boundaries
between ourselves and those categories of individuals
whom we believe [or hope] to be more at risk than
ourselves.2
As the quotes above indicate, fear of disease and of the sick
is part of the human condition. Tuberculosis must have been a
terrifying disease. It killed slowly and unpredictably, but
relentlessly. It lurked in the tenements of the poor, where it
struck people in what should have been their prime years, sometimes
wiping out entire families. Medical professionals and social
reformers, already struggling to meet the challenges presented by
rapidly increasing numbers of the urban poor, searched for ways to
contain the disease. In their anxiety, they sometimes applied such
labels as Wicious  consumptives, lr3 Wnteachablen4 or "incorrigi-
'Mary Douglas, Purity and Dancer: An Analvsis of Concents  of
Pollution and Taboo (Great Britain: Pelican Books, 1970), p. 13.
2Sander L. Gilman, Disease and Representation: Imaaes of
Illness from Madness to AIDS (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1988),  p. 4.
3John P.C. Foster, llDetention  Institutions for Ignorant and
ViCiOUS  Consumptives," First Annual Meetina of the Societv  for the
Study and Prevention of Tuberculosis (New York: Irving Press,
1906),  pp. 333-8.
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ble115  to their patients. Anxiety is also evident in medical
PreOCCUpatiOn  with labelling the stages of the disease, rhetoric
about the need for places in which-to house the dangerously
advanced cases, and in discussions about which level of government
should be responsible for these hopelessly  ill patients. Hart-
ford's City Council was reluctant to care for them in either the
almshouse or city hospital, and the directors of Hartford Hospital
Were confronted with a choice between attracting  middle class
patients and admitting chronic consumptives to the main hospital
building. One can read fear in the alacrity with which the
COnneCticUt  legislature voted funds for five sanatoria in ten years
and even in the melancholy fact that, though patients came
reluctantly, sanatorium beds remained full.
Given such apprehension and dread, it is not surprising that
sanatoria were embraced as a way to separate at least SOme of the
most dangerous ill from the well. Even if social science research
had been sophisticated enough to reveal how ineffective sanatoria
were at achieving cures, it is doubtful that anyone would have
listened. Hartford's powerful players in the development of public
policy all had reasons for desiring a place in the country for the
tubercular poor: Physicians and hospital administrators wanted to
4Ellen LaMotte, "The Unteachable Consumptive,Vt  Transactions.of
the Sixth International Congress on Tuberculosis (Philadelphia:
William F. Fell Co., 1908),  pp. 256-60.
5E. 0. Otis, et. al., "HOW may the best results be obtained in
the care of the incorrigible consumptive in towns where there are
no hospitals?" American Journal of Public Health 4 (December
1914): 1204-8.
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free their beds for paying patients, municipal authorities did not
want to be forced to fund a city hospital or to enlarge the
almshouse, state-level politicians saw that local solutions were
inadequate and wanted monuments to their civic concern. The
sanatorium, a combination of communicable disease hospital, asylum
and poorhouse, was a logical extension of existing medical models.
By focusing upon details about where such institutions should be
built and which patients belonged in them, politicians and
physicians alike reassured the public that the problem of what to'
do with people with tuberculosis was being addressed.
There were of course patients who needed and benefitted from
sanatorium care. Active, open tuberculosis was (and is) highly
infectious, and sufferers require care and attention. Despite the
loneliness, the spartan living conditions, the work masquerading
as therapeutic exercise, for some these country retreats must have
provided food and rest that were unavailable in their harried
tenement lives. Above all, sanatoria offered what the sick and
their families needed most -- hope, and tangible evidence that
others recognized their need for care and attention.
I wish to suggest, however, that the presence of sanatoria
served more to lull the fears of the uninfected than actually to
control the disease. Not even patients who were able to stay three
months or more were commonly cured. Nor, apparently, did they die
at the sanatoria, but were discharged back into the family and
community, infective as ever. As measures to stop the spread of
p,
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tuberculosis, sanatoria failed; as mechanisms to allay public
anxiety they were more successful.
Although historians are correct to define *'social control" as
central to an understanding of the progressive reform and institu-
tion-building, this paper demonstrates how complex the forces were
thatdictatedthe forms institutions would take in specific  places.
It shows too that policy makers and professionals could change the
shape of the institutions they created as they went along; John
Gunshanan and his peers were clearly able to respond to the lessons
of experience.
A study such as this which considers sanatoria only from the
point of view of administrators, physicians and politicians labors
under a heavy burden, for it is impossible to test the rhetoric of
the times against actual data. What kinds of people were admitted?
Whatwerethe outcomes when measured by modern statistical methods?
HOW much staff consisted of ex-patients, and what was their
bargaining power? How vulnerable were administrators to political
pressures and how corrupt were they? The complete story of
sanatoria will remain untold until access to sanatorium records,
including medical records of patients, enables questions such as
those to be answered.
Our understanding of sanatoria in this period is also
incomplete because we know almost nothing about attitudes towards
tuberculosis and institutionalization, especially among working
class and immigrant populations. I have been unable to locate any
depiction of the disease in popular culture, not in photographs,
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film, paintings, popular songs, stories, or novels (except as a
convenient way to remove a character from the action). It appears
in newspapers only as dry announcements of medical lectures, the
opening of sanatoria, the dangers of spitting -- never as human
interest pieces about real people. Not even any middle class
memoirs, diaries or accounts of sanatorium life were published.
The silence is so great that it demands explanation, and the only
way I can interpret it is to posit an almost phobic response --
people did not even want to think about it.
It is fascinating to speculate about the effects of the
establishment of a sanatorium system upon the later development of
medical care. Had general hospitals had nowhere to send consump-
tive patients, would they have been slower to develop into
efficient providers of acute care? Would today's health care
system be better able to manage home care of chronic illness if
institutions had not been defined as the optimal locus of treatment
eighty years ago? Would we have mechanisms to make medical
supervision of home treatment possible or to grant public funds to
non-professional care givers or relatives?6
Perhaps the most urgent reason to study the sanatorium
movement is that now, almost a century after they began to open in
large numbers, there are those who believe that sanatoria, or
similar institutions, should be reopened.7 There have already
6Pointed  out by Barbara Bates, Baraainins for Life, p. 333.
7The question first arose regarding HIV positive patients.
See David Rothman  and Eileen Tynan, "Advantages and Disadvantages
of Special Hospitals for Patients with HIV Infection," New Ensland
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been instances in which people with tuberculosis who did not take
their medicine have been forcibly hospitalized.8 How to ensure
that all infected people complete the arduous medical regimen
required to treat today's drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis
while at the same time respecting their civil rights remains a
matter of debate.g Fear is building again. When New York
Masazine has two articles about tuberculosis in as many years, 10
when newspaper articles carry headlines such as, "Crowded Jail
Cells Breed Fear of Tuberculosis, "ll'lT~p  Scientist Warns Tubercu-
losis Could Become Major Threat,"12 and "AIDS Patients, Facing
Journal of Medicine 323 (September 13, 1990): 764 - 8. The authors
conclude that disadvantages outweigh advantages.
8Josh Barbanel, "Rise in Tuberculosis Forces Review of Dated
Methods" New York Times (February 11, 1992),  Section B, page 1;
Janice Hopkins Tanne, "Q & A about TB," New York Masazine (March
25, 1992): 35.
'The  current favorite is "directly observed therapy", by which
each dose of medication must be witnessed. Michael Specter,
"Tougher Measures to Fight TB Urged by New York Panel", New York
Times (November 30, 1992),  p. 1. The latest medical thinking on
the matter may be found in: George J. Annas, "Control of Tuber-
culosis -- The Law and The Public's Health," New England Journal of
Medicine 328 (February 23, 1993): 585-8; Michael Iseman, MD, David
Cohn, MD, and John Sbarbaro, MD, "Directly Observed Treatment of
Tuberculosis, 11 New Enqland Journal of Medicine 328 (February 23,
1993): 576-8.
loTanne, "The Truth About TB" New York Maqazine (November 5,
1990): 92 - 5; Tanne, "Q t A About TB."
"Mireya Navarro, New York Times (January 30, 1992) Section B
p. 1.
12Lawrence K. Altman, New York Times (February 11, 1992),
Section C p. 3.
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TB, Now Fear Even the Hospital,"13 it is clear that people are
worried.
It is the historian's task to reveal that the sanatorium on
Masic  Mountain existed only as a fictional metaphor, and that even
Trudeau's .famous facility in beautiful Saranac was for paying
patients only. The poor and the 1@advanced8V cases were turned
away.14 When we know what sanatoria were really like and what
they really accomplished, we will be better able to decide what
kinds of institutions, if any, we need to treat tuberculosis today.
13Navarro,  Sundav New York Times (March 15, 1992),  Metro
Section, p. 1.
14Philip L. Gallos,
Lake:
Cure Cottases of Saranac Lake (Saranac
Historic Saranac Lake, 1985),  p. 16.
EPILOGUE
As I finished this project, the following paragraph appeared
as part of a long article in the Sunday newspaper's magazine
section. It sounds depressingly familiar:
Hospitals don't have to be homophobic  to want to avoid
AIDS patients. Such patients are more like~~soto be
indigent and unable to pay their bills. , the
knowledge that a hospital15has  many AIDS patients may
drive other patients away.
Here are the issues just identified for 1900 - 1910, being
presentedas somethin new. Rosenberg's observation that perception
of disease is both context-specific  and context-determining 1 6
offers the hope that with an understanding of the context, it will
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be possible to change the perception and hence, perhaps, the
context. This has already occurred, in part, in the case of AIDS;
the public and private silence so remarkable in the tuberculosis
instance was broken early and loudly. Still, the lessons of
tuberculosis remain as cautionary  tales.
15Joel  Lang, "HIV PositiveW1  Northeast [Magazine section,
Hartford Courant), Sunday March 7, 1993, p. 16.
l%harles E- Rosenberg, *'Introduction,"  in Pramino  Disease:
Studies in Cultural History, eds. Rosenberg and Janet Golden (New
Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. xx.














